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Abstract. The Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (hrc) mod-
els the allocation of intending junior doctors to hospitals where couples
are allowed to submit joint preference lists over pairs of (typically ge-
ographically close) hospitals. It is known that a stable matching need
not exist, so we consider min bp hrc, the problem of finding a matching
that admits the minimum number of blocking pairs (i.e., is “as stable
as possible”). We show that this problem is NP-hard and difficult to
approximate even in the highly restricted case that each couple finds
only one hospital pair acceptable. However if we further assume that the
preference list of each single resident and hospital is of length at most 2,
we give a polynomial-time algorithm for this case. We then present the
first Integer Programming (IP) and Constraint Programming (CP) mod-
els for min bp hrc. Finally, we discuss an empirical evaluation of these
models applied to randomly-generated instances of min bp hrc. We find
that on average, the CP model is about 1.15 times faster than the IP
model, and when presolving is applied to the CP model, it is on average
8.14 times faster. We further observe that the number of blocking pairs
admitted by a solution is very small, i.e., usually at most 1, and never
more than 2, for the (28,000) instances considered.
1 Introduction
The Hospitals / Residents problem. The Hospitals / Residents problem
(hr) [14] is a many-to-one allocation problem that models the assignment process
involved in centralised matching schemes such as the National Resident Match-
ing Program (NRMP) [45] which assigns graduating medical students to hospital
posts in the USA. Analogous schemes exist in Canada [40] and Japan [42]. A
similar process was used until recently to match medical graduates to Founda-
tion Programme places in Scotland: the Scottish Foundation Allocation Scheme
(SFAS) [21]. Moreover, similar matching schemes exist in the context of Higher
Education admission in Hungary [4,43], Spain [32], Turkey [3] and Ireland [41,43].
The reader is referred to [43] for details of matching practices in a number of
practical contexts throughout Europe.
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2An instance of hr consists of two sets of agents – a set R = {r1, . . . rn1} con-
taining residents and a set H = {h1, . . . hn2} containing hospitals. Every resident
expresses a linear preference over some subset of the hospitals, his preference list.
The hospitals in a resident’s preference list are his acceptable partners; all other
hospitals being unacceptable. Every hospital expresses a linear preference over
those residents who find it acceptable. Further, each hospital hj ∈ H has a pos-
itive integral capacity cj , the maximum number of residents to which it may be
assigned. A matching M is a set of acceptable resident-hospital pairs such that
each resident appears in at most one pair and each hospital hj belongs to at
most cj pairs. If (ri, hj) ∈M then ri is said to be assigned to hj , M(ri) denotes
hj , and ri is an assignee of hj . Given ri ∈ R, if ri does not belong to any pair
in M then ri is said to be unassigned. Given hj ∈ H, we let M(hj) denote the
set of assignees of hj in M . Hospital hj is undersubscribed, full or oversubscribed
according as |M(hj) is less than, equal to, or larger than cj , respectively.
Roth [34] argued that a key property to be satisfied by any matching M in
an instance I of hr is stability, which ensures that M admits no blocking pair
in I. Informally, such a pair comprises a resident ri and a hospital hj , both
of whom have an incentive to disregard their assignments (if any) and become
matched to one another outside of M , undermining its integrity. A matching is
stable if it admits no blocking pair. It is known that every instance of hr admits
at least one stable matching, which can be found in time linear in the size of the
instance [14].
The Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples. The Hospitals / Res-
idents problem with Couples (hrc) is a generalisation of hr that is important
in practical applications because it models the case where some of the residents
may apply jointly in couples, so that they may be matched to hospitals that are
geographically close to one another. In order to ensure this, a couple submits
a joint preference list over pairs of hospitals, rather than individual hospitals.
Matching schemes for junior doctors such as the NRMP [45] allow couples to
apply jointly, as do assignment processes in the US Navy [31, 37, 39] (for which
hrc is an appropriate problem model), for example.
Formally, an instance I of hrc consists of a set R = {r1, . . . rn1} containing
residents and a set H = {h1, . . . hn2} containing hospitals. The residents in R
are partitioned into two sets, S and S′. The set S consists of single residents
and the set S′ consists of those residents involved in couples. There is a set
C = {(ri, rj) : ri, rj ∈ S′} of couples such that each resident in S′ belongs to
exactly one pair in C.
Each single resident ri ∈ S expresses a linear preference order over some
subset of the hospitals, his acceptable hospitals; all other hospitals being unac-
ceptable. Each couple (ri, rj) ∈ C expresses a joint linear preference order over a
subset A of H×H where (hp, hq) ∈ A represents the simultaneous assignment of
ri to hp and rj to hq. The hospital pairs in A represent those joint assignments
that are acceptable to (ri, rj), all other joint assignments being unacceptable.
Each hospital hj ∈ H expresses a linear preference order over those residents
3who find it acceptable, either as a single resident or as part of a couple, and as
in the case of hr, each hospital hj ∈ H has a positive integral capacity cj .
A matching M in I is defined as in hr case, with the additional restriction
that, for each couple (ri, rj) ∈ C, either both ri and rj appear in no pair of M ,
or else {(ri, hk), (rj , hl)} ⊆M for some pair (hk, hl) that (ri, rj) find acceptable.
In the former case, (ri, rj) are said to be unassigned, whilst in the latter case,
(ri, rj) are said to be jointly assigned to (hk, hl). Given a resident ri ∈ R, the
definitions of M(ri), assigned and unassigned are the same as for the hr case,
whilst for a hospital hj ∈ H, the definitions of assignees, M(hj), undersubscribed,
full and oversubscribed for hospitals are also the same as before.
We seek a stable matching, which guarantees that no resident and hospital,
and no couple and pair of hospitals, have an incentive to deviate from their as-
signments and become assigned to each other outside of the matching. Roth [34]
considered stability in the hrc context but did not define the concept explicitly.
Whilst Gusfield and Irving [17] gave a formal definition of a blocking pair, it
neglected to deal with the case that both members of a couple may wish to be
assigned to the same hospital. A number of other stability definitions for hrc
have since been given in the literature that address this issue (see [6] and [23, Sec-
tion 5.3] for more details), including that of McDermid and Manlove [27], which
we adopt in this paper. We repeat their definition again here for completeness.
Definition 1 ([27]) Let I be an instance of hrc. A matching M is stable in I
if none of the following holds:
1. There is a single resident ri and a hospital hj, where ri finds hj acceptable,
such that either ri is unassigned in M or prefers hj to M(ri), and either hj
is undersubscribed in M or prefers ri to some member of M(hj).
2. There is couple (ri, rj) and a hospital hk such that either
(a) (ri, rj) prefers (hk,M(rj)) to (M(ri),M(rj)), and either hk is under-
subscribed in M or prefers ri to some member of M(hk)\{rj} or
(b) (ri, rj) prefers (M(ri), hk) to (M(ri),M(rj)), and either hk is undersub-
scribed in M or prefers rj to some member of M(hk)\{ri}.
3. There is a couple (ri, rj) and a pair of (not necessarily distinct) hospi-
tals hk 6= M(ri), hl 6= M(rj) such that (ri, rj) finds (hk, hl) acceptable,
and either (ri, rj) is unassigned or prefers the joint assignment (hk, hl) to
(M(ri),M(rj)), and either
(a) hk 6= hl, and hk (respectively hl) is either undersubscribed in M or
prefers ri (respectively rj) to at least one of its assignees in M ; or
(b) hk = hl, and hk has two free posts in M , i.e., ck − |M(hk)| ≥ 2; or
(c) hk = hl, and hk has one free post in M , i.e., ck − |M(hk)| = 1, and hk
prefers at least one of ri, rj to some member of M(hk); or
(d) hk = hl, hk is full in M , hk prefers ri to some rs ∈ M(hk), and hk
prefers rj to some rt ∈M(hk)\{rs}.
A resident and hospital, or a couple and hospital pair, satisfying one of the
above conditions, is called a blocking pair of M and is said to block M .
4Existing algorithmic results for hrc. An instance I of hrc need not admit
a stable matching [34]. We call I solvable if it admits a stable matching, and
unsolvable otherwise. Also an instance of hrc may admit stable matchings of
differing sizes [2]. Further, the problem of deciding whether a stable matching
exists in an instance of hrc is NP-complete, even in the restricted case where
there are no single residents and each hospital has capacity 1 [28,33]. The decision
problem is also W[1]-hard [25] when parameterized by the number of couples.
In many practical applications of hrc the residents’ preference lists are short.
Let (α, β, γ)-hrc denote the restriction of hrc in which each single resident’s
preference list contains at most α hospitals, each couple’s preference list contains
at most β pairs of hospitals and each hospital’s preference list contains at most γ
residents. Biro´ et al. [8] showed that deciding whether an instance of (0, 2, 2)-hrc
admits a stable matching is NP-complete.
Heuristics for hrc were described and compared experimentally by Biro´ et
al. [5]. As far as exact algorithms are concerned, Biro´ et al. [8] gave an Integer
Programming (IP) formulation for finding a maximum cardinality stable match-
ing (or reporting that none exists) in an arbitrary instance of hrc and presented
an empirical evaluation of an implementation of their model, showing that their
formulation was capable of solving instances of the magnitude of those arising in
the SFAS application. Further algorithmic results for hrc are given in [6,23,26].
Most-stable matchings. Given that a stable matching need not exist in a given
hrc instance I, a natural question to ask is whether there is some other matching
that might be the best alternative amongst the matchings in I. Roth [35, 36]
argued that instability in the outcome of an allocation process gives participants
a greater incentive to circumvent formal procedures; it follows minimising the
amount of instability might be a desirable objective. Eriksson and Ha¨ggstro¨m
[12] suggested that the number of blocking pairs admitted by a matching is a
meaningful way to measure its degree of instability.
Define bp(M) to be the set of blocking pairs relative to a matching M in
I, and define a most-stable matching to be a matching M for which |bp(M)| is
minimum, taken over all matchings in I. Clearly if I admits a stable matching M ,
then M is a most-stable matching in I. Let min bp hrc denote the problem of
finding a most-stable matching, given an instance of hrc. Most-stable matchings
have been studied from an algorithmic point of view in various matching problem
contexts [1,9,10,13,18,19] (see [23] for more details), including in humanitarian
organisations [38]. Define (α, β, γ)-min bp hrc to be the restriction of min bp
hrc to instances of (α, β, γ)-hrc.
Contribution of this work. In Section 2 we show that (∞, 1,∞)-min bp hrc is
NP-hard and not approximable within n1−ε1 , for any ε > 0, unless P=NP (recall
that n1 is the number of residents in a given instance). In this highly restricted
case of min bp hrc, each couple finds only one hospital pair acceptable and each
hospital has capacity 1 (∞ refers to preference lists of unbounded length). We
also show that (∞,∞, 1)-min bp hrc and (2, 1, 2)-min bp hrc are solvable in
polynomial time. These results help to narrow down the search for the boundary
5between polynomial-time solvable and NP-hard restrictions ofmin bp hrc (recall
that (0, 2, 2)-min bp hrc is NP-hard [8]).
In Section 3 we present the first IP model for min bp hrc; indeed this
model can be used to find a most-stable matching of maximum cardinality. This
formulation extends our earlier IP model for hrc, presented in [8]. Then in
Section 4 we present data from an empirical evaluation of an implementation
of the IP model for min bp hrc applied to randomly-generated instances. We
measure the mean solution time, mean size of a most-stable matching and mean
number of blocking pairs admitted by a most-stable matching when varying (i)
the number of residents, (ii) the number of couples, (iii) the number of hospitals
and (iv) the lengths of the residents’ preference lists. Our main finding is that,
over the 28,000 instances considered, the number of blocking pairs admitted by
a most-stable matching is very small: it is usually at most 1, and never more
than 2. This suggests that in a given hrc instance in practice, even if a stable
matching does not exist, we may be able to find a matching with only a very
small amount of instability.
Finally, in Section 5 we present the first Constraint Programming (CP) model
for min bp hrc and evaluate its performance compared to the IP model over
the instances used for the empirical analysis in Section 4. We observe that on
average, the CP model is about 1.15 times faster than the IP model, and when
presolving is applied to the CP model, it is on average 8.14 times faster.
Related work. Drummond et al. [11] presented SAT and IP encodings of hrc
and investigated empirically their performance, along with two earlier heuris-
tics for hrc, on randomly-generated instances. Their main aim was to measure
the time taken to find a stable matching or report that none exists, and the
proportion of solvable instances. They found that the SAT encoding gave the
fastest method and was generally able to resolve the solvability question for the
highest proportion of instances. In another paper [30], the same authors con-
ducted further empirical investigations on random instances using an extension
of their SAT encoding to determine how many stable matchings were admitted,
and whether a resident Pareto optimal stable matching existed. We remark that
the results in [11, 30] are not directly comparable to ours, because the stabil-
ity definition considered in those papers is slightly weaker than that given by
Definition 1. See Appendix A for a discussion of this issue.
Hinder [20] presented an IP model for a general stable matching problem with
contracts, which includes hrc as defined here, as a special case. He conducted
an empircal study on randomly-generated instances, comparing the performance
of the IP model, its LP relaxation and a previously-published heuristic. Hinder
showed that the LP relaxation finds stable matchings (when they exist) with
much higher probability than the heuristic, and with probability quite close
to the true value given by the IP model. The IP model terminates surprisingly
quickly when the number of residents belonging to a couple is 10%, but it should
be emphasised that in Hinder’s random instances, all hospitals have capacity 1.
In such a case our IP/CP models would be much simpler and need not involve the
6constraints corresponding to stability criteria 3(b), 3(c) and 3(d) in Definition
1, thus our runtime results are not directly comparable to Hinder’s.
To the best of our knowledge there have been no previous CP models for hrc,
though a CP model for hr was given in [24], extending an earlier CP model for
the classical Stable Marriage problem, the 1-1 restriction of hr [16]. A detailed
survey of CP models for stable matching problems is given in [23, Section 2.5].
Nguyen and Vohra [29] proved a remarkable result, namely that it is always
possible to find a stable matching in an instance of hrc if the capacity of each
hospital can be adjusted (up or down) by at most 4, with the total capacity of
the hospitals increasing by at most 9.
2 Complexity results for min bp hrc
In this section we present complexity and approximability results for min bp
hrc in the case that preference lists of some or all of the agents are of bounded
length. We begin with (∞, 1,∞)-min bp hrc, the restriction in which each couple
lists only one hospital pair on their preference list. Even in this highly restricted
case, the problem of finding a most-stable matching is NP-hard and difficult to
approximate. The proof of this result, given in Appendix B, begins by showing
that, given an instance of (∞, 1,∞)-hrc, the problem of deciding whether a stable
matching exists is NP-complete. Then a gap-introducing reduction is given from
this problem to (∞, 1,∞)-min bp hrc.
Theorem 2 (∞, 1,∞)-min bp hrc is NP-hard and not approximable within a
factor of n1−ε1 , for any ε > 0, unless P=NP, where n1 is the number of residents
in a given instance. The result holds even if each hospital has capacity 1.
We now turn to the case that hospitals’ lists are of bounded length. It will
be helpful to introduce the notion of a fixed assignment in a given hrc instance
I. This involves either (i) a resident-hospital pair (ri, hj) such that hj is the first
choice of ri, and ri is among the first cj choices of hj , or (ii) a pair comprising a
couple (ri, rj) and a pair of hospitals (hp, hq) such that hp (resp. hq) is the first
choice of ri (resp. rj), and ri (resp. rj) is among the first cp (resp. cq) choices of
hp (resp. hq). Clearly any stable matching must contain all the fixed assignments
in I. By eliminating the fixed assignments iteratively, we arrive at the following
straightforward result for (∞,∞, 1)-hrc (the proofs of all the results stated in
this section from this point onwards can be found in Appendix C).
Proposition 3 An instance I of (∞,∞, 1)-hrc admits exactly one stable match-
ing, which can be found in polynomial time.
We now consider the (2, 1, 2)-hrc case. The process of satisfying a fixed as-
signment involves matching together the resident(s) and hospital(s) involved,
deleting the agents themselves (and removing them from the remaining prefer-
ence lists). This may uncover further fixed assignments, which themselves can
be satisfied. Once this process terminates, we say that all fixed assignments have
been iteratively satisfied. Let I be the (2, 1, 2)-hrc instance that remains. It turns
out that I has a special structure, as the following result indicates.
7Lemma 4 An arbitrary instance of (2, 1, 2)-hrc involving at least one couple
and in which all fixed assignments have been iteratively satisfied must be con-
structed from sub-instances of the form shown in Figure 8 (see Appendix C) in
which all of the hospitals have capacity 1.
It is then straightforward to find a most-stable matching in each such sub-
instance.
Lemma 5 Let I ′ be an instance of (2, 1, 2)-hrc of the form shown in Figure
8 in Appendix C. If I ′ has an even number of couples then I ′ admits a stable
matching M . Otherwise I ′ admits a matching M such that |bp(M)| = 1 in I ′.
Using Lemmas 4 and 5, it follows that we can find a most-stable matching
in an instance I of (2, 1, 2)-hrc as follows. Assume that M0 is the matching
in I in which all fixed assignments have been iteratively satisfied, and assume
that the corresponding deletions have been made from the preference lists in I,
yielding instance I ′. Lemma 4 shows that I ′ is a union of disjoint sub-instances
I1, I2, . . . , It, where each Ij is of the form shown in Figure 8 in Appendix C
(1 ≤ j ≤ t). Let j (1 ≤ j ≤ t) be given and let Nj be the number of couples
in Ij . Lemma 5 implies that, if Nj is even, we may find a stable matching Mj
in Ij , otherwise we may find a matching Mj in Ij such that |bp(Mj)| = 1 in Ij .
It follows that M = ∪tj=0Mj is a most-stable matching in I. This leads to the
following result.
Theorem 6 (2, 1, 2)-min bp hrc is solvable in polynomial time.
It remains open to resolve the complexity of (p, 1, q)-hrc for constant values
of p and q where max{p, q} ≥ 3.
3 An Integer Programming formulation for min bp hrc
In this section we describe our IP model for min bp hrc, which extends the
earlier IP model for hrc presented in [8] (we discuss relationships between the
two models at the end of this section). Let I be an instance of hrc; we will
denote by J the IP model corresponding to I. Due to space limitations we will
only present some of the constraints in J ; the full description of J is contained
in Appendix D.
Notation. We first define some required notation in I. Without loss of gen-
erality, suppose residents r1, r2 . . . r2c are in couples. Thus r2c+1, r2c+2 . . . rn1
comprise the single residents. Again, without loss of generality, suppose that the
couples are (r2i−1, r2i) (1 ≤ i ≤ c). Suppose that the joint preference list of
a couple Ci = (r2i−1, r2i) is (hα1 , hβ1), (hα2 , hβ2) . . . (hαl , hβl). From this list we
say that hα1 , hα2 . . . hαl and hβ1 , hβ2 . . . hβl are the individual preference lists for
r2i−1 and r2i respectively. Let l(ri) denote the length of a resident ri’s individual
preference list (regardless of whether ri is a single resident or ri belongs to a
couple).
8For a resident ri ∈ R (whether single or a member of a couple), let pref(ri, p)
denote the hospital at position p of ri’s individual preference list. For an accept-
able resident-hospital pair (ri, hj), let rank(hj , ri) = q denote the rank that
hospital hj assigns resident ri, where 1 ≤ q ≤ l(hj). Thus, rank(hj , ri) is equal
to the number of residents that hj prefers to ri plus 1.
Further, for each j (1 ≤ j ≤ n2) and q (1 ≤ q ≤ l(hj)), let the set R(hj , q)
contain resident-position pairs (ri, p) such that ri ∈ R is assigned a rank of q by
hj and hj is in position p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(ri)) on ri’s individual list. Hence
R(hj , q) = {(ri, p) ∈ R×Z : rank(hj , ri) = q ∧ 1 ≤ p ≤ l(ri)∧ pref(ri, p) = hj}.
Variables in the IP model. For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n1) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(ri)),
J has a variable xi,p ∈ {0, 1} such that xi,p = 1 if and only if ri is assigned to
his pth-choice hospital. Also, for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n1) and p = l(ri) + 1, J has
a variable xi,p ∈ {0, 1} such that xi,p = 1 if and only if ri is unassigned. Let
X = {xi,p : 1 ≤ i ≤ n1 ∧ 1 ≤ p ≤ l(ri) + 1}.
J also contains variables θi,p ∈ {0, 1} for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n1) and p (1 ≤
p ≤ l(ri)). The intuitive meaning of a variable θi,p is that θi,p = 1 if and only if
resident ri is involved in a blocking pair with the hospital at position p on his
individual preference list, either as a single resident or as part of a couple.
Constraints in the IP model. We firstly add constraints to J which force
every variable to be binary valued. Next we ensure that matching constraints are
satisfied, as follows. As each resident ri ∈ R is assigned to exactly one hospital or
is unassigned (but not both),
∑l(ri)+1
p=1 xi,p = 1 must hold for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ n1).
Similarly, since a hospital hj may be assigned at most cj residents, xi,p = 1
where pref(ri, p) = hj for at most cj residents, and hence for all j (1 ≤ j ≤ n2),∑n1
i=1
∑l(ri)
p=1 {xi,p ∈ X : pref(ri, p) = hj} ≤ cj must hold.
For each couple (r2i−1, r2i), r2i−1 is unassigned if and only if r2i is unassigned,
and r2i−1 is assigned to the hospital in position p in their individual list if and
only if r2i is assigned to the hospital in position p in their individual list. Thus
for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ c) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(r2i−1) + 1), x2i−1,p = x2i,p must hold,
The remaining constraints in J allow the number of blocking pairs of a given
matching to be counted. Each such constraint deals with a specific type of block-
ing pair that satisfies a given part of Definition 1. It allows a blocking pair to
exist involving either (i) a single resident ri with the hospital at some position
p on his list, or (ii) a couple (r2i−1, r2i) with the hospital pair at some position
p on their joint list, if and only if θi,p = 1. We illustrate the construction of
J by giving the constraint corresponding to so-called “Type 1” blocking pairs,
involving involve single residents, where Condition 1 of Definition 1 is satisfied.
The other constraints may be dealt with in a similar fashion – see Appendix D
for further details.
Type 1 blocking pairs. In a matching M in I, if a single resident ri ∈ R is
unassigned or has a worse partner than some hospital hj ∈ H where pref(ri, p) =
hj and rank(hj , ri) = q then hj must be fully subscribed with better partners
than ri, for otherwise (ri, hj) blocks M . Hence if ri is unassigned or has worse
9partner than hj , i.e.,
l(ri)+1∑
p′=p+1
xi,p′ = 1, and hj is not fully subscribed with better
partners than ri, i.e.,
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′ , p′′) ∈ R(hj , q′)} < cj , then we
require θi,p = 1 to count this blocking pair. Thus, for each i (2c + 1 ≤ i ≤ n1)
and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(ri)) we obtain the following constraint where pref(ri, p) = hj
and rank(hj , ri) = q:
cj
l(ri)+1∑
p′=p+1
xi,p′
− θi,p
 ≤ q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′ , p′′) ∈ R(hj , q′)}.
Objective functions in the IP model. A maximum cardinality most-stable
matching M is a matching of maximum cardinality, taken over all most-stable
matchings in I. To compute a maximum most-stable matching in J , we apply
two objective functions in sequence.
First we find an optimal solution in J that minimises the number of blocking
pairs. To this end we apply the objective function min
n1∑
i=1
l(ri)∑
p=1
θi,p.
The matching M corresponding to an optimal solution in J will be a most-
stable matching in I. Let k = |bp(M)|. Now we seek a maximum cardinality
matching in I with at most k blocking pairs. Thus we add the following constraint
to J , which ensures that, when maximising on cardinality, any solution also has
at most k blocking pairs:
n1∑
i=1
l(ri)∑
p=1
θi,p ≤ k.
The final step is to maximise the size of the matching, subject to the matching
being most-stable. This involves optimising for a second time, this time using
the following objective function: max
n1∑
i=1
l(ri)∑
p=1
xi,p.
The following result, which establishes the correctness of the IP formulation,
is proved in Appendix D.
Theorem 7 Given an instance I of min bp hrc, let J be the corresponding
IP model as defined above. A maximum cardinality most-stable matching in I is
exactly equivalent to an optimal solution to J .
We remark that the IP model presented in this section develops the earlier
model for hrc [8] with the addition of the θi,p variables. There are similarities
between the constraints (with these variables omitted) when comparing the two
models. However in the hrc model [8] essentially all stability constraints had
to be satisfied, whereas in the min bp hrc model a blocking pair is allowed
at the expense of a θi,p variable having value 1, which allows the number of
blocking pairs to be counted. Suitable placement of the θi,p variables within the
constraints from the hrc model allows this condition on the θi,p variables to be
enforced.
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4 Empirical results from the IP model for min bp hrc
In this section we present data from an empirical evaluation of an implementation
of the IP model for finding a maximum cardinality most-stable matching in an
instance of min bp hrc. We considered the following properties for randomly-
generated hrc instances: the time taken to find a maximum cardinality most-
stable matching, the size of a maximum cardinality most-stable matching and
the number of blocking pairs admitted by a most-stable matching. We show how
these properties varied as we modified the number of residents, the percentage
of residents involved in couples, the number of hospitals and the lengths of
residents’ preference lists in the constructed instances.
Methodology. We ran all the experiments on an implementation of the IP
model using the CPLEX 12.4 Java Concert API applied to randomly-generated
instances of hrc1. In these instances, the preference lists of residents and hos-
pitals were constructed to take into account of the fact that, in reality, some
hospitals and residents are more popular than others, respectively. Typically,
the most popular hospital in the SFAS context had 5-6 times as many appli-
cants as the least popular, and the numbers of applicants to the other hospitals
were fairly uniformly distributed between the two extremes. Our constructed
instances reflected this real-world behaviour. For more details about the con-
struction of the instances and the correctness testing methodology, the reader is
referred to [26, Chapters 6,7].
All experiments were carried out on a desktop PC with an Intel i5-2400
3.1Ghz processor with 8Gb of memory running Windows 7. To find a most-
stable matching in an instance I of hrc we applied the following procedure.
We first used the hrc IP implementation presented in [8] to find a maximum
cardinality stable matching M in I if one exists. Clearly, if I is solvable then M
is a maximum cardinality most-stable matching. However, if I was found to be
unsolvable, we applied the min bp hrc IP model to I. In this case we applied a
lower bound of 1 to the number of blocking pairs in a most-stable matching in
I since we knew that no stable matching existed. All instances were allowed to
run to completion. We remark that the min bp hrc model appears to be much
more difficult to solve than the hrc model presented in [8], and thus the largest
instances sizes considered here are smaller than the largest ones generated in the
experimental evaluation in [8].
Experiment 1. In the first experiment we increased the number of residents
while maintaining a constant ratio of couples, hospitals and posts to residents.
For various values of x (50 ≤ x ≤ 150) in increments of 20, 1000 randomly gener-
ated instances were created containing x residents, 0.1x couples (and hence 0.8x
single residents) and 0.1x hospitals with x available posts that were randomly
distributed amongst the hospitals. Each resident’s preference list contained a
minimum of 3 and a maximum of 5 hospitals. Figure 1 (and indeed all the fig-
ures in this section) shows the mean time taken to find a maximum cardinality
1 All generated instances can be obtained from http://dx.doi.org/10.5525/gla.
researchdata.303.
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Fig. 1. Empirical results for Experiment 1.
most-stable matching, the mean size of a maximum cardinality most-stable so-
lution (in each case over both solvable and unsolvable instances), and the mean
and maximum number of blocking pairs admitted by most-stable matchings.
The results show that the time taken to find an optimal solution increases
with x, with the min bp hrc formulation being more difficult to solve in general
than the hrc formulation. The mean size of an optimal solution increases with
x for both solvable and unsolvable instances (it is around 95% of x for x = 50,
decreasing to around 93% of x for x = 150, with the optimal matching size for
unsolvable instances being very slightly larger than that for solvable instances).
Perhaps most interestingly, the maximum number of blocking pairs was 1, with
the mean at most 0.1, and the mean number of unsolvable instances being 77.
Experiment 2. In our second experiment we increased the percentage of
residents involved in couples while maintaining the same numbers of residents,
hospitals and posts. For various values of x (0 ≤ x ≤ 30) in increments of 5, 1000
randomly generated instances were created containing 100 residents, x couples
(and hence 100− 2x single residents) and 10 hospitals with 100 available posts
that were unevenly distributed amongst the hospitals. Each resident’s preference
list contained a minimum of 3 and a maximum of 5 hospitals. The results for all
values of x are displayed in Figure 2.
The results show that the time taken to find an optimal solution increases
with x; again the min bp hrc formulation is more difficult to solve in general
than the hrc formulation. The mean size of an optimal solution decreases with
x for both solvable and unsolvable instances; again the optimal matching size
for unsolvable instances is slightly larger than that for solvable instances. As for
Experiment 1, the maximum number of blocking pairs was 1, with the number
of unsolvable instances increasing from 50 for x = 5 to 224 for x = 30.
Experiment 3. In our third experiment we increased the number of hospitals
in the instance while maintaining the same numbers of residents, couples and
posts. For various values of x (10 ≤ x ≤ 100) in increments of 10, 1000 randomly
generated instances were created containing 100 residents, 10 couples (and hence
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Fig. 3. Empirical results for Experiment 3.
80 single residents) and x hospitals with 100 available posts that were unevenly
distributed amongst the hospitals. Each resident’s preference list contained a
minimum of 3 and a maximum of 5 hospitals. The results for all values of x are
displayed in Figure 3.
The results show that the time taken to find an optimal solution decreases
with x; again the min bp hrc model solution time is slower than that for the
hrc model. Clearly the problem is becoming less constrained as the number of
hospitals increases. Also the mean size of an optimal solution decreases with x
for both solvable and unsolvable instances; again the optimal matching size for
unsolvable instances is slightly larger than that for solvable instances. This time
the maximum number of blocking pairs was 2, with the mean number of blocking
pairs decreasing from 0.08 for x = 20 to 0.04 for x = 100.
Experiment 4. In our last experiment, we increased the length of the indi-
vidual preference lists for the residents in the instance while maintaining the
same numbers of residents, couples, hospitals and posts. For various values of
x (2 ≤ x ≤ 6), 1000 randomly generated instances were created containing 100
residents, 10 couples (and hence 80 single residents) and 10 hospitals with 100
13
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Fig. 4. Empirical results for Experiment 4.
available posts that were unevenly distributed amongst the hospitals. Each res-
ident’s preference list contained exactly x hospitals. The results for all values of
x are displayed in Figure 4.
The results show that increasing the preference list length makes the problem
harder to solve; again the min bp hrc model is slower to solve than the hrc
model. Also the mean size of an optimal solution increases with x for both solv-
able and unsolvable instances as more options become available in the preference
lists (from 86.4 for x = 2 to 97.5 for x = 6 in the case of unsolvable instances);
again the optimal matching size for unsolvable instances is slightly larger than
that for solvable instances. The maximum number of blocking pairs was 1, with
the mean at most 0.1, and the mean number of unsolvable instances being 81.
Discussion. The results presented in this section suggest that, even as we in-
crease the number of residents or hospitals, the percentage of residents involved
in a couple or the length of the residents’ preference lists, the number of blocking
pairs admitted by a most-stable matching is very low. For most of the 28,000
instances generated in our experimental evaluation, the most-stable matchings
found admitted at most 1 blocking pair, and the maximum number of blocking
pairs admitted by any most-stable matching was never more than 2. These find-
ings are essentially consistent with the results of Nguyen and Vohra [29], who
showed that an unsolvable hrc instance only requires a small amount of pertur-
bation in order to become solvable. Further empirical investigation is required
to determine whether this behaviour is replicated for larger hrc instance sizes.
5 A Constraint Programming model for min bp hrc
In addition to the IP model, we designed a Constraint Programming model
for min bp hrc and implemented this using the MiniZinc constraint modelling
language.
We assume that residents’ preference lists are given by integer variables
rpref [i][j], which play a similar role to pref (ri, j) in the IP model, and that
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hospitals’ ranking arrays are given by integer variables hrank [h, i], which are
analogous to rank(hj , ri) in the IP model. The lengths of the preference lists of
a resident ri and a hospital hj are given by rpref len[i] and hpref len[j] respec-
tively. The capacity of a hospital hj is given by hosp cap[j].
For each single resident ri, the model includes an integer variable single pos[i]
with domain (1, . . . , l(ri) + 1), where l(ri) is the value of rpref len[i], which
takes the value j if ri is assigned her jth-choice hospital, or l(ri) + 1 if ri is
unassigned. For each couple i, we include an integer variable coup pos[i] with a
similar interpretation.
Each single resident’s single pos[i] variable is channelled to an array of l(ri)
boolean variables single assigned [i], such that single assigned [i][j] = true if and
only if single pos[i] = j, and a variable single unassigned [i], such that sin-
gle unassigned [i] = true if and only if single pos[i] = l(ri) + 1. Similarly, we
have boolean coup assigned and coup unassigned variables for each couple.
For each hospital i, and each position j on hospital i’s preference list, we
have a boolean variable hosp assigned [i][j] which is true if and only if hos-
pital i is assigned its jth-choice resident. We include a constraint to ensure
that hosp assigned [i][j] = true if and only if a corresponding single assigned
or coup assigned variable is also true. Furthermore, each hospital has a linear
inequality constraint to ensure that its capacity is not exceeded.
For each position on the preference list of a single resident or couple, we
create a boolean variable single bp[i][j] or coup bp[i][j] indicating whether the
resident or couple, along with their jth-choice hospital, constitutes a blocking
pair. For each type of blocking pair, we define a set of constraints and then give
some brief intuition.
Type 1 blocking pairs
constraint forall (i in Singles) (
forall(j in 1 . . . rpref len[i]) (
let {int: h =rpref [i, j], int: q =hrank [h, i]} in
single pos[i] > j ∧ hosp would prefer(h, q)⇒ single bp[i, j] ));
The hosp would prefer predicate for a hospital h and a position q on the pref-
erence list of h takes the value true if and only if h has fewer than hosp cap[h]
assigned residents in positions strictly preferable to position q on its preference
list. (Note the redundancy in this predicate: all we actually need is the first
sum(. . . )(. . . ) < hosp cap[h] constraint; the sum(. . . )(. . . ) > 0 constraint im-
proves propagation.)
predicate hosp would prefer(int:h, int:q) =
if q ≤ hosp cap[h] then
true
else
sum(k in 1 . . . q − 1)(bool2int(hosp assigned [h, k])) < hosp cap[h] ∨
sum(k in q + 1 . . . hpref len[h])(bool2int(hosp assigned [h, k])) > 0
endif;
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The constraint for Type 1 blocking pairs thus sets single bp[i, j] to true if
and only if ri is unassigned or prefers h to his partner, and h is undersubscribed
or prefers ri at least one of its assignees, where h = rpref [i, j].
Type 2a/b blocking pairs
constraint forall (i in Couples) (
let {int: r1 = first in couple(i), int: r2 = second in couple(i)} in
forall(j in 1 . . . rpref len[r1] (
let {int: h1 = rpref [r1, j], int: h2 = rpref [r2, j],
int: q1 =hrank [h1, r1], int: q2 = hrank [h2, r2]} in
coup pos[i] > j ∧
((hosp would prefer exc partner(h1, h2, q1, q2) ∧
h2 = rpref [r2,coup pos[i]]) ∨
(hosp would prefer exc partner(h2, h1, q2, q1) ∧
h1 = rpref [r1,coup pos[i]]))
⇒ coup bp[i, j]
)
);
The hosp would prefer exc partner predicate on inputs h1, h2, q1, q2 (where
h1, h2 are hospitals and q1, q2 are positions on their preference lists respectively)
takes the value true if and only if (a) h1 = h2, q1 < q2 and the number of h1’s
assignees that it prefers to its q1th choice is less than hosp cap[h1] − 1, or (b)
h1 6= h2 or q1 > q2 and the number of h1’s assignees that it prefers to its q1th
choice is less than hosp cap[h1].
predicate hosp would prefer exc partner(int:h1, int:h2, int:q1, int:q2) =
if h1 = h2 ∧ q1 < q2 then
sum(k in 1 . . . q1− 1)(bool2int(hosp assigned [h1, k])) < hosp cap[h1]− 1
else
sum(k in 1 . . . q1− 1)(bool2int(hosp assigned [h1, k])) < hosp cap[h1]
endif;
The constraint for Type 2a/b blocking pairs thus sets coup bp[i, j] to true if
and only if couple (r1, r2) prefer hospital pair (h1, h2) to their joint assignment
(h3, h4), where either
(a) h2 = h4 and either h1 is undersubscribed or prefers r1 to at least one assignee
that is not r2 (if r2 is assigned to h1) or
(b) h1 = h3 and either h2 is undersubscribed or prefers r2 to at least one assignee
that is not r1 (if r1 is assigned to h2).
Type 3a blocking pairs
constraint forall (i in Couples) (
let {int: r1 = first in couple(i), int: r2 = second in couple(i)} in
forall(j in 1 . . . rpref len[r1] where rpref [r1, j] != rpref [r2, j]) (
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let {int: h1 =rpref [r1, j], int: h2 = rpref [r2, j],
int: q1 = hrank [h1, r1], int: q2 = hrank [h2, r2]} in
hosp would prefer(h1, q1) ∧ hosp would prefer(h2, q2) ∧
h1 != rpref [r1,coup pos[i]] ∧ h2 != rpref [r2,coup pos[i]] ∧
coup pos[i] > j ⇒ coup bp[i, j]
)
);
The constraint for Type 3a blocking pairs thus sets coup bp[i, j] to true if and
only if couple (r1, r2) are unassigned or prefer (h1, h2) to their joint assignment,
whilst for each k ∈ {1, 2}, hk is undersubscribed or prefers rk to at least one of
its assignees, where (r1, r2) is the ith couple and (h1, h2) is the hospital pair at
position j of their joint list.
Type 3b/c/d blocking pairs
constraint forall (i in Couples) (
let {int: r1 = first in couple(i), int: r2 = second in couple(i)} in
forall(j in 1 . . . rpref len[r1] where rpref [r1, j] = rpref [r2, j]) (
let {int: h = rpref [r1, j], int: q1 = hrank [h, r1],
int: q2 = hrank [h, r2]} in
if q1 < q2 then
hosp would prefer2(h, q1) ∧ hosp would prefer(h, q2)
else
hosp would prefer(h, q1) ∧ hosp would prefer2(h, q2)
end if ∧
coup pos[i] > j ∧
h ! = rpref [r1,coup pos[i]] ∧ h ! = rpref [r2,coup pos[i]]
⇒ coup bp[i, j]
)
);
The hosp would prefer2 predicate for a hospital h and a position q on the
preference list of h takes the value true if and only if h has fewer than hosp cap[h]−
1 assigned residents in positions strictly preferable to position q on its prefer-
ence list. (Note the redundancy in this predicate: all we actually need is the first
sum(. . . )(. . . ) < hosp cap[h] − 1 constraint; the sum(. . . )(. . . ) > 1 constraint
improves propagation.)
predicate hosp would prefer2(int:h, int:q) =
sum(k in 1 . . . q − 1)(bool2int(hosp assigned [h, k])) < hosp cap[h]− 1 ∨
sum(k in q + 1 . . . hpref len[h])(bool2int(hosp assigned [h, k])) > 1 ;
The constraint for Type 3b/c/d blocking pairs thus sets coup bp[i, j] to true
if and only if couple (r1, r2) are unassigned or prefer (h, h) to their joint as-
signment, whilst h either has two free posts (Type 3b), or h has one free post
and prefers one of r1 or r2 to at least one of its assignees (Type 3c), or h is
full and and prefers r1 to some assignee rk, and prefers r2 to at least one of its
17
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Fig. 5. Comparison of run times using CP (with and without presolve) and MIP models
assignees apart from rk (Type 3d), where (r1, r2) is the ith couple and (h, h) is
the hospital pair at position j of their joint list.
Experiments. The CP model was solved using the lazy clause solver Chuffed
[44] on the same machine that was used for the experiments on the IP model as
reported in Section 4. All instances were allowed to run to completion. We present
results on the runtime of the CP model both with and without presolving. The
presolve step, when included, specifies in advance which set S of resident-hospital
pairs will block the solution (in practice we try out values of k = 0, 1, 2, . . .
and generate all subsets S of size k until we reach a feasible solution) and then
performs preference list deletions in the knowledge that the pairs in S will block.
This allows large reductions in the model size, and works well because the number
of blocking pairs admitted by a most-stable matching is generally very small, as
we saw in Section 4. We did not use presolve with the IP model, but we note
that it may be possible to solve the IP model more quickly by carrying out this
step.
Figure 5 plots the mean run times for each of the four experiments for the IP
model and for the CP models with and without presolving: each plot in the top
row shows results for the solvable instances in one experiment, and each plot in
the bottom row shows corresponding results for the unsolvable instances. Table
1 shows the actual mean and median runtimes for each model, taken over all
28,000 instances I across all four experiments, those instances from I that were
solvable and those from I that were unsolvable.
The CP model without presolve generally performs unfavourably for solvable
instances. Here, the IP model is faster than the CP model with presolve; this
is likely to be due to the fact that for such instances, the earlier IP model for
18
Instance type Mean Median
IP model CP model IP model CP model
No presolve Presolve No presolve Presolve
All 2.568 2.237 0.315 0.031 0.430 0.129
Solvable 0.034 1.839 0.143 0.016 0.402 0.127
Unsolvable 30.781 6.669 1.276 8.948 3.240 1.395
Table 1. Summary of mean and median runtimes over all experiments (all timings are
in seconds)
hrc [8] is used instead of the more complex IP formulation for min bp hrc.
For unsolvable instances, the CP model (with or without presolve) is faster than
the IP model. This is likely to be due to the fact that the CP model for min
bp hrc is more compact than its IP counterpart, involving fewer variables and
constraints. Comparing total run time summed across all 28,000 instances, the
CP model was 1.15 times faster than the CP model without presolve, and the
CP model with presolve was 8.14 times faster than the IP model.
When solving the CP model, the distribution of runtimes for the case without
presolve had a very long right tail; 14 of the 28,000 instances accounted for over
half of the total run time. The longest-running instance took 17,617 seconds, and
surprisingly this was a solvable instance (generated for Experiment 2). For this
reason, Table 1 shows median run times as well as mean run times; from this
we can see that the median runtime for the IP model is lower than that for the
CP models for all instances and for solvable instances. However for unsolvable
instances, the median runtime for CP without presolve is 2.762 times faster
than the median runtime for IP, and this factor increases to 6.414 for CP with
presolve.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have presented complexity and approximability results for min
bp hrc, showing that the problem is NP-hard and very difficult to approximate
even in highly restricted cases. We have then presented IP and CP models,
together with empirical analyses of both models applied to randomly-generated
hrc instances. Our main finding is that most-stable matchings admit a very
small number of blocking pairs (in most cases at most 1, but never more than 2)
on the instances we generated. We also showed that on average the CP model is
faster than the IP model, with the performance of the CP model being enhanced
if presolving was carried out. As far as future work is concerned, it would be
interesting to determine the effect of presolving on the IP model, and more
generally, to investigate further methods to enable the models to be scaled up
to larger instances, such as column generation in the case of the IP model, and
variable / value ordering heuristics in the case of the CP model.
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Appendix
A Comparison of stability definitions
In this section we compare our stability definition for hrc given by Defini-
tion 1 with the definition adopted by Drummond et al. [11]. Suppose that I
is an instance of hrc and M is a matching in I. Let R′ ⊆ R. For a given
hospital hj , Drummond et al. defined Chj(R
′) to be the set of residents that
hj would select from R
′. That is, Chj(R′) is the maximal subset of R′ such
that, for all ri ∈ Chj(R′), hj finds ri acceptable, hj prefers ri to any rk ∈
R′\Chj(R′) and |Ch(R′)| ≤ cj . Then Drummond et al. defined the predicate
willAccept(hj , R
′,M) to be true if and only if R′ ⊆ Chj(M(hj) ∪R′).
Now suppose that (ri, rj) is a couple in I who prefer the hospital pair (hk, hk)
to their assigned hospital pair (M(ri),M(rj)), where hk is full in M . According
to Condition 3(b) of the stability definition of Drummond et al. [11], hk will par-
ticipate in a blocking pair with (ri, rj) if and only if willAccept(hk, {ri, rj},M).
According to Condition 3(d) of Definition 1, hk will participate in a blocking
pair with (ri, rj) if and only if hk prefers ri to some rs ∈M(hk), and hk prefers
rj to some rt ∈M(hk)\{rs}. Our Condition 3(d) is thus weaker than Condition
3(b) of Drummond et al. [11], meaning that our stability definition is stricter.
To illustrate the difference, consider the hrc instance I shown in Figure 6.
Here h1 has capacity 2, whilst each of h2 and h3 has capacity 1.
Residents Hospitals
(r1, r2) : (h1, h1) (h2, h3) h1 : r1 r3 r2 r4
r3 : h1 h2 : r1
r4 : h1 h3 : r1
Fig. 6. An instance of hrc.
Let M be the matching {(r1, h2), (r2, h3), (r3, h1), (r4, h1)}. Then (r1, r2)
forms a blocking pair of M with the hospital pair (h1, h1) according to the
stability definition given in Definition 1, but this does not happen with re-
spect to the stability definition of Drummond et al. [11]. In the latter case,
Chj(M(h1) ∪ {r1, r2}) = Chj({r1, r2, r3, r4}) = {r1, r3} 6⊇ {r1, r2}. We would
argue that (r1, r2) should form a blocking pair with (h1, h1), because h1 unequiv-
ocally improves by rejecting {r3, r4} and taking on {r1, r2} instead.
B Inapproximability result for (∞, 1,∞)-min bp hrc
We now establish that the problem of deciding whether an instance of (∞, 1,∞)-
hrc admits a stable matching is NP-complete.
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Theorem 8 Given an instance of (∞, 1,∞)-hrc, the problem of deciding whether
there exists a stable matching is NP-complete. The result holds even if each hos-
pital has capacity 1.
Proof. The proof of this result uses a reduction from a restricted version of the
vertex cover problem. More specifically, let vc3 denote the problem of deciding,
given a cubic graph G and an integer K, whether G contains a vertex cover of
size at most K. This problem is NP-complete [15,22].
The problem of deciding whether there exists a stable matching in an instance
of (∞, 1,∞)-hrc is clearly in NP, as a given assignment may be verified to be
a stable matching in polynomial time. To show NP-hardness, let 〈G,K〉 be an
instance of vc3, where G = (V,E), E = {e1, . . . , em} and V = {v1, . . . , vn}. For
each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), suppose that vi is incident to edges ej1 , ej2 and ej3 in G,
where without loss of generality j1 < j2 < j3. Define ei,s = ejs (1 ≤ s ≤ 3).
Similarly, for each j (1 ≤ j ≤ m), suppose that ej = {vi1 , vi2}, where without
loss of generality i1 < i2. Define vj,r = vir (1 ≤ r ≤ 2).
We form an instance I of (∞, 1,∞)-hrc as follows. The set of residents in I
is A∪B∪F ∪R∪X ∪Y where A = {at : 1 ≤ t ≤ K}, B = {bt : 1 ≤ t ≤ n−K},
F =
⋃K
t=1 Ft, where Ft = {fst : 1 ≤ s ≤ 6}, R =
⋃m
j=1Rj , where Rj = {rsj : 1 ≤
s ≤ 4}, X = {xi : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} and Y =
⋃n−K
t=1 Yt, where Yt = {yst : 1 ≤ s ≤ 6}.
The set of hospitals in I is G ∪H ∪ P ∪ Q ∪ Z, where G = ⋃Kt=1Gt, where
Gt = {grt : 1 ≤ r ≤ 3} (1 ≤ t ≤ K), H =
⋃m
j=1Hj , Hj = {hsj : 1 ≤ s ≤ 2} ,
P = {pt : 1 ≤ t ≤ K}, Q = {qt : 1 ≤ t ≤ n − K} and Z =
⋃n−K
t=1 Zt, where
Zt = {zrt : 1 ≤ r ≤ 3} and each hospital has capacity 1. The preference lists of
the resident couples, single residents and hospitals in I are shown in Figure 7.
In the preference list of a resident xi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) the symbol hs(xi) (1 ≤
s ≤ 3) denotes the hospital hrj (1 ≤ r ≤ 2) such that ej = ei,s and vi = vj,r.
Similarly, in the preference list of a hospital hrj (1 ≤ j ≤ m, 1 ≤ r ≤ 2) the
symbol x(hrj) denotes the resident xi such that vi = vj,r.
We claim that G contains a vertex cover of size at most K if and only if
I admits a stable matching. Let C be a vertex cover in G such that |C| ≤ K.
Without loss of generality we may assume that |C| = K for if otherwise a
sufficient number of vertices can be added to C without violating the vertex
cover condition.
We show how to define a matchingM in I as follows. Let C = {vr1 , vr2 , . . . , vrK}
where without loss of generality r1 < r2 < . . . < rK . Further let V \ C =
{vs1 , vs2 , . . . , vsn−K} where without loss of generality s1 < s2 < . . . < sn−k. For
each vertex vri ∈ C add the pairs {(xri , pi), (ai, gi), (f3i , g2i ), (f4i , g3i )} for 1 ≤ i ≤
K to M . For each vertex vsi ∈ V \C add {(xsi , qi), (bi, zi), (y3i , z2i ), (y4i , z3i )} for
1 ≤ i ≤ n−K to M .
For each edge ej ∈ E at least one of vj,1 or vj,2 must be in C. If vj,1 ∈ C
add the pairs {(r3j , h1j ), (r4j , h2j )} to M . Otherwise vj,2 ∈ C so add the pairs
{(r1j , h1j ), (r2j , h2j )} to M .
We now show that M is a stable matching in I. Firstly, we show that no
hospital hrj ∈ H (1 ≤ j ≤ m, 1 ≤ r ≤ 2) can form part of a blocking pair
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t ) (1 ≤ t ≤ n−K)
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t ) (1 ≤ t ≤ n−K)
at : pt gt (1 ≤ t ≤ K)
bt : qt zt (1 ≤ t ≤ n−K)
xi : p1 p2 . . . pK h
1(xi) h
2(xi) h
3(xi) q1 q2 . . . qn−K (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
Hospitals’ Preferences
g1t : at f
1
t f
6
t (1 ≤ t ≤ K)
g2t : f
3
t f
2
t (1 ≤ t ≤ K)
g3t : f
5
t f
4
t (1 ≤ t ≤ K)
h1j : r
1
j x(h
1
j ) r
3
j (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
h2j : r
4
j x(h
2
j ) r
2
j (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
pt : x1 x2 . . . xn at (1 ≤ t ≤ K)
qt : x1 x2 . . . xn bt (1 ≤ t ≤ n−K)
z1t : bt y
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t y
6
t (1 ≤ t ≤ n−K)
z2t : y
3
t y
2
t (1 ≤ t ≤ n−K)
z3t : y
5
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4
t (1 ≤ t ≤ n−K)
Fig. 7. Preference lists in I, the constructed instance of (∞, 1,∞)-hrc.
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of M . Assume a hospital hrj ∈ H is part of a blocking pair of M for some
j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) and r (1 ≤ r ≤ 2). Now, since C is a vertex cover in G, an
arbitrary edge ej ∈ E must covered by either vj,1 or vj,2 or both. Assume firstly
that vj,1 ∈ C. Then by construction (xrt , pt) ∈ M and {(r3j , h1j ), (r4j , h2j )} ⊆ M
where vj,1 = vrt . Assume (x(h
1
j ), h
1
j ) blocks M for some j (1 ≤ j ≤ m). Since
vj,1 ∈ C and thus M(x(h1j )) ∈ P , x(h1j ) prefers M(x(h1j )) to h1j , a contradiction.
Now assume that ((r1j , r
2
j ), (h
1
j , h
2
j )) blocks M . However, h
2
j prefers M(h
2
j ) = r
4
j
to r2j , a contradiction.
Now assume vj,1 /∈ C. Then vj,2 ∈ C and by construction (xrt′ , pt′) ∈ M
and {(r1j , h1j ), (r2j , h2j )} ⊂ M where vj,2 = vrt′ . Assume (x(h2j ), h2j ) blocks M
for some j (1 ≤ j ≤ m). Since vj,2 ∈ C and thus M(x(h2j )) ∈ P , x(h2j )
prefers M(x(h2j )) to h
2
j , a contradiction. Now assume ((r
3
j , r
4
j ), (h
1
j , h
2
j )) blocks
M . However, h1j prefers M(h
1
j ) = r
1
j to r
3
j , a contradiction. Thus, no h
r
j ∈ H
(1 ≤ j ≤ m, 1 ≤ r ≤ 2) can form part of a blocking pair of M .
We now show that no hospital in P
⋃
Q can be involved in a blocking pair
of M . By construction M(pt) ∈ X for all t (1 ≤ t ≤ K). Assume some pair
(xk1 , pl1) blocks M . Let M(xk1) = pl2 and M(pl1) = xk2 . Since (xk1 , pl1) blocks
M then l1 < 12 and k1 < k1 in contradiction to the construction of M . A similar
argument shows that no hospital in Q may be involved in a blocking pair of M
and thus we have that no hospital in P
⋃
Q may be involved in a blocking pair
of M .
We now show that no hospital in G
⋃
Z can be involved in a blocking pair
of M . Firstly, assume a hospital gst ∈ H is part of a blocking pair of M for some
t (1 ≤ t ≤ K) and s (1 ≤ s ≤ 3). Clearly, since g1t and g2t are both assigned
their first preference they cannot form part of a blocking pair for M . Hospital g3t
prefers f5t to M(g
3
t ) = f
4
t . However, f
5
t is a member of the couple (f
5
t , f
6
t ) that
expresses a joint preference for the pair (g3t , g
1
t ) and g
1
t prefers M(g
1
t ) = at to
f6t , a contradiction. Thus, no hospital g
s
t ∈ H (1 ≤ t ≤ K, 1 ≤ s ≤ 3) can form
part of a blocking pair of M . A similar argument may be used to show that no
zst ∈ H (1 ≤ t ≤ n −K, 1 ≤ s ≤ 3) can form part of a blocking pair of M and
thus we have that no hospital in G
⋃
Z can be involved in a blocking pair of M .
We now have that no hospital in I may be part of a blocking pair of M and
thus M must be stable.
Conversely, let M be a stable matching in I. We first show that the stability of
M implies that M(xi) ∈ P
⋃
Q for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Observe that if (at, g1t ) /∈M
for t (1 ≤ t ≤ K) then no stable assignment is possible amongst the agents in
Ft
⋃
Gt as shown in Lemma 13. However, if {(at, g1t ), (f3t , g2t ), (f4t , g3t )} ⊆ M
then no blocking pair exists in Ft
⋃
Gt. It follows that if (at, g
1
t ) ∈ M then
(at, pt) blocks M unless M(pt) ∈ X. A similar argument shows that M(qt) ∈ X
for all t (1 ≤ t ≤ n−K). Now, since |X| = n and |P ⋃Q| = n, clearly all x ∈ X
must be partnered with a member of P
⋃
Q and moreover, M(xi) /∈ H in any
stable matching in I.
Next we show that the stability of M implies that h1j and h
2
j are fully sub-
scribed in M for all j (1 ≤ j ≤ m). Let j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) be given. Assume
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that both h1j and h
2
j are undersubscribed in M . Since M(x(h
r
j)) 6= hrj for all j, r
(1 ≤ j ≤ m, 1 ≤ r ≤ 2), ((r1j , r2j ), (h1j , h2j )) blocks M , a contradiction. Thus either
{(r1j , h1j ), (r2j , h2j ))} ⊆M or {(r3j , h1j ), (r4j , h2j ))} ⊆M in any stable matching in I.
If {(r1j , h1j ), (r2j , h2j ))} ⊆ M then ((r3j , r4j ), (h1j , h2j )) does not block M . Similarly,
if {(r3j , h1j ), (r4j , h2j ))} ⊆ M then ((r1j , r2j ), (h1j , h2j )) does not block M . Thus we
have that h1j and h
2
j are fully subscribed in M for all j (1 ≤ j ≤ m). Moreover,
we have that all hospitals must be fully subscribed in any stable matching M in
I.
Define a set of vertices C in G as follows. For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) if M(xi) ∈ P ,
add vi to C. Since M is a stable matching and |P | = K, this process selects
exactly K of the n vertices in V and thus |C| = K. We now show that C
represents a vertex cover in G. Consider an arbitrary edge ej ∈ E. Assume
that both vj,1 /∈ C and vj,2 /∈ C and hence that C is not a vertex cover in G.
Then M(xj,1) ∈ Q and M(xj,2) ∈ Q. As M is stable and thus hospital complete,
either {(r1j , h1j ), (r2j , h2j )} ⊂M or {(r3j , h1j ), (r4j , h2j )} ⊂M . If {(r1j , h1j ), (r2j , h2j )} ⊂
M then (xj,2, h
2
j ) blocks M , a contradiction. If {(r3j , h1j ), (r4j , h2j )} ⊂ M then
(xj,1, h
1
j ) blocks M , a contradiction. Hence C represents a vertex cover in G of
size K and the theorem is proven. uunionsq
Corollary 9 (∞, 1,∞)-min bp hrc is NP-hard and not approximable within a
factor of n1−ε1 , for any ε > 0, unless P=NP, where n1 is the number of residents
in a given instance. The result holds even if each hospital has capacity 1.
Proof. The proof of this result is analogous to the proof of Theorem 2 in [7],
which establishes the same result for (0, 2, 2)-min bp hrc, using the NP-complete-
ness of the problem of deciding whether a stable matching exists in a given
instance of (0, 2, 2)-hrc as a starting point. The restrictions on the preference
list lengths are not used in the gap-introducing reduction that proves the inap-
proximability result, hence the same reduction can be used to demonstrate the
inapproximability of (∞, 1,∞)-min bp hrc. uunionsq
C Efficiently solvable variants of min bp hrc
C.1 Fixed assignments in hrc
In an instance I of hrc some agents may rank one another highly in their
preference lists, leading to the outcome that they must be assigned to one another
in any stable matching in I. We describe these agents as fixed assignments,
using the following lemma to define this concept formally and to show that fixed
assignments must belong to any stable matching in I.
Lemma 10 Let I be an arbitrary instance of hrc.
(i) If a single resident ri has a hospital hj in first place on his preference list
and ri is within the first cj places on hj’s preference list then (ri, hj) must
belong to any stable matching in I.
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(ii) If a couple (ri, rj) has a hospital pair (hp, hq) in first place on its joint
preference list and ri is within the first cp places on hp’s preference list and
also rj is within the first cq places on hq’s preference list then (ri, rj) must
be jointly assigned to (hp, hq) in any stable matching in I.
Any pair consisting of a single resident and a single hospital satisfying Case (i),
or consisting of a couple and hospital pair satisfying Case (ii), is called a fixed
assignment in I.
Proof. The proof of the Lemma follows immediately from the fact that any
matching M in which ri is not assigned to hj will be blocked by (ri, hj), and
similarly, any matching M in which (ri, rj) and (hp, hq) are not assigned to each
other will be blocked by (ri, rj) with (hp, hq). uunionsq
Suppose that a matching M is constructed solely by matching agents who
are involved in fixed assignments. As a consequence, suppose some pair (ri, hj)
is added to M . Clearly no other hospital may be assigned in M to ri, and hence
ri can be deleted from the preference list of each other hospital in which he ap-
pears. Moreover, in the event that hj becomes fully subscribed by accepting ri
as an assignee, hj can be deleted from the preference list of each resident other
than ri in which it appears. We say that we satisfy a fixed assignment if we
match together in M the agents involved, and then carry out the corresponding
deletions as described above. Note that making these deletions may expose an-
other fixed assignment in the resulting reduced instance of hrc, which can then
also be satisfied in M . If we continue satisfying fixed assignments until no more
fixed assignments are exposed then we say all fixed assignments have been itera-
tively satisfied in M . This idea is used in the proof of the following proposition,
to show that a stable solution can be found in an instance of (∞,∞, 1)-hrc in
polynomial time.
Proposition 11 An instance I of (∞,∞, 1)-hrc admits exactly one stable match-
ing, which can be found in polynomial time.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary single resident ri in I. Let the hospital in first
place on resident r’s preference list be hj . Since ri must be in first place in hj ’s
preference list (as it is the only preference expressed by hj), the pair (ri, hj)
represents a fixed assignment in I. Thus, any single resident in I must be part
of exactly one fixed assignment in I and this may be satisfied by assigning each
single resident to the hospital in first place on his preference list.
Now, consider an arbitrary couple (ri, rj) in I. Let the hospital pair (hp, hq)
be in first place on couple (ri, rj)’s joint preference list. Clearly, since ri (re-
spectively rj) is in first place on hp’s (respectively hq’s) preference list, (ri, rj)
with (hp, hq) represents a fixed assignment in I. Thus, any resident couple in I
must be part of exactly one fixed assignment in I and this may be satisfied by
assigning each couple to the hospital pair in first place on their joint preference
list.
Hence, the fixed assignments involving both the single residents and the
couples in I may be satisfied iteratively in time linear in the number of residents
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in I, leading to a matching M that is clearly stable in I, and which is the only
stable matching in I. uunionsq
C.2 (2, 1, 2)-min bp hrc is efficiently solvable
Let I be an instance of (2, 1, 2)-hrc, and assume that M0 is a matching in I in
which all fixed assignments have been iteratively satisfied, and assume that the
corresponding deletions have been made from the preference lists in I. In Lemma
12 below, we use the absence of fixed assignments in I to infer that I must be
constructed from the union of a finite number of disjoint discrete sub-instances
of (2, 1, 2)-hrc and further that each disjoint sub-instance I ′ of I must be of
the form shown in Figure 8. Let I ′ be one of these disjoint sub-instances of I.
We prove in Lemma 13 that the number of couples involved in I ′ determines
whether I ′ admits a stable matching: indeed, I ′ admits a stable matching if and
only if the number of couples in I ′ is even.
Lemma 12 An arbitrary instance of (2, 1, 2)-hrc involving at least one couple
and in which all fixed assignments have been iteratively satisfied must be con-
structed from sub-instances of the form shown in Figure 8 in which all of the
hospitals have capacity 1.
Proof. Let I be an arbitrary instance of (2, 1, 2)-hrc in which all fixed assign-
ments have been iteratively satisfied. Observe that if a couple expresses a pref-
erence for a hospital pair (hp, hp) this would represent a fixed assignment, a
contradiction. Thus, no couple may express such a preference in I. We now show
how the absence of fixed assignments in I allows us to infer the preference lists
for all of the agents involved in I.
Let (r1c1 , r
2
c1) be a couple in I and further let (h
0
c1 , h
1
c1) be the hospital pair
for which (r1c1 , r
2
c1) expresses a preference. Since all fixed assignments have been
iteratively satisfied by construction, it cannot be the case that both:
(i) h0c1 has capacity two or has r
1
c1 in first place in its preference list and
(ii) h1c1 has capacity two or has r
2
c1 in first place in its preference list.
Without loss of generality, assume that h1c1 has capacity one and does not
have r2c1 in first place in its preference list. Hence there exists some other resident
rx who is preferred by h
1
c1 . Clearly, this resident is either a member of a couple
or is a single resident. We now consider both of these cases and show that the we
must arrive at the same outcome in either case. In what follows nk (1 ≤ k ≤ nN )
represents the number of single residents generated following couple ck as the
preference lists of the residents are inferred in the proof.
Case (i): rx is single and thus n1 > 0. In this case let rx = r
1
s1 . Since r
1
s1 is in first
place in the preference list of h1c1 , to prevent a fixed assignment, there must exist
another hospital that is preferred by r1s1 ; let this be h
2
c1 . If h
2
c1 has capacity two
then (r1s1 , h
2
c1) represents a fixed assignment, a contradiction. Hence, h
2
c1 must
have capacity one.
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cN h
2
cN : r
2
sN r
1
sN
...
...
rnNsN : h
0
c1 h
nN
cN h
nN
cN : r
nN
sN r
nN−1
sN
Fig. 8. An instance of (2, 1, 2)-hrc containing an arbitrary number of couples and
an arbitrary number of residents that has no unsatisfied fixed assignments.
Now, since r1s1 has h
2
c1 in first place in its preference list, there must exist
some other resident who is preferred by h2c1 . We consider first the case where
each newly generated resident is single. Hence, let this new resident be a single
resident, r2s1 . Since r
2
s1 is in first place on the preference list of h
2
c1 there must exist
another hospital which is preferred by r2s1 ; let this new hospital be h
3
c1 . Assume
h3c1 has capacity two. In that case (r
1
s1 , h
2
c1) represents a fixed assignment, a
contradiction. Hence, h3c1 must have capacity one.
We may continue constructing a sequence of distinct single residents and hos-
pitals of capacity one, but as the number of single residents is finite, ultimately
we must eventually arrive at a resident who is a member of a couple; let this
resident be r1c2 . Without loss of generality suppose that r
1
c2 is the first member of
the couple to which he belongs. Let rn1s1 be the final single resident constructed
in the preceding sequence.
It follows that rn1s1 prefers some hospital h
n1+1
c1 of capacity one to h
n1
c1 . If
hn1+1c1 = h
0
c1 then I contains precisely one couple and the instance is of the form
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Residents
(r1c1 , r
2
c1) : (h
0
c1 , h
1
c1)
(r1ck , r
2
ck ) : (h
nk−1+1
ck−1 , h
1
ck ) 2 ≤ k ≤ N − 1
(r1cN , r
2
cN ) : (h
nN−1+1
cN−1 , h
1
cN ) nN > 0
(r1cN , r
2
cN ) : (h
nN−1+1
cN−1 , h
0
c1) nN = 0
rask : h
a+1
ck h
a
ck 1 ≤ k ≤ N, 1 ≤ a ≤ nk, nk > 0
Hospitals
h0c1 : r
1
c1 r
nN
sN if nN > 0
h0c1 : r
1
c1 r
2
cN if nN = 0
h1ck : r
1
sk r
2
ck 1 ≤ k ≤ N , if nk > 0
h1ck : r
1
ck+1 r
2
ck 1 ≤ k ≤ N , if nk = 0
hack : r
a
sk r
a−1
sk 1 ≤ k ≤ N , 2 ≤ a ≤ nk, if nk > 0
h
nk+1
ck : r
1
ck+1 r
nk
sk 1 ≤ k ≤ N − 1, if nk > 0
Fig. 9. An exactly equivalent description of the instance shown in Figure 8
shown in Figure 8 where N = 1 and n1 > 0. Otherwise h
n1+1
c1 is a new hospital
of capacity one that prefers r1c2 to r
n1
s1 . Since h
n1+1
c1 has r
1
c2 in first place on
its preference list, it must be the case that r1c2 expresses a joint preference as
part of the couple (r1c2 , r
2
c2) for a hospital pair involving h
n1+1
c1 ; let this pair be
(hn1+1c1 , h
1
c2). Since h
n1+1
c1 has r
1
c2 in first place on its preference list, h
1
c2 must
be of capacity one and prefer some other resident to r2c2 , otherwise (r
1
c2 , r
2
c2)
represents a fixed assignment with (hn1+1c1 , h
1
c2), a contradiction. Now, let this
other resident be ry.
Case (ii): rx is a member of a couple and thus n1 = 0. Let rx = r
1
c2 . Then h
1
c1
prefers r1c2 to r
2
c1 . Assume that r
1
c2 is part of a couple (r
1
c2 , r
2
c2) and further assume
that (r1c2 , r
2
c2) finds (h
1
c1 , h
1
c2) acceptable. If h
1
c2 = h
0
c1 then I contains exactly
two couples and is of the form shown in Figure 8 with N = 2 and n1 = n2 = 0.
(In this case h0c1 prefers r
1
c1 to r
2
c2 .) Otherwise, h
1
c2 is a new hospital which must
be of capacity one, or (r1c2 , r
2
c2) represents a fixed assignment with (h
1
c1 , h
1
c2), and
moreover h1c2 must prefer some other resident to r
2
c2 ; let this resident be ry.
Thus in both cases we have that if h1c2 6= h0c1 then h1c2 is of capacity one and
prefers some resident ry to r
2
c2 . Clearly, ry is either a member of a couple or is
a single resident. As before, we consider both of these cases and show that we
must arrive at the same outcome in either case.
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Case (i): ry is single and thus n2 > 0; In this case let ry = r
1
s2 . Since r
1
s2 is in
first place on the preference list of h1c2 , it follows that h
1
c2 cannot be in first place
in the preference list of r1s2 . Hence, there must exist another hospital preferred
by r1s2 ; let this be h
2
c2 . Further, h
2
c2 must be of capacity one and have a resident
other than r1s2 in first place in its preference list; let this resident be r
2
s2 . We
consider first the case where each newly generated resident is single. Suppose
r2s2 is single. Since r
2
s2 is in first place on the preference list of h
2
c2 there must
exist another hospital which is preferred by r2s2 ; let this new hospital be h
3
c2 .
Hospital h3c2 must have capacity one, otherwise (r
2
s2 , h
3
c2) would represent a fixed
assignment.
We may continue generating a sequence of distinct single residents and hos-
pitals of capacity one, but since the number of residents is finite, we must even-
tually arrive at a resident who is a member of a couple; let this resident be r1c3 .
Without loss of generality suppose that r1c3 is the first member of the couple to
which he belongs. Let rn2s2 be the final single resident in the previously generated
sequence. Then rn2s2 prefers some hospital h
n2+1
c2 to h
n2
c2 and h
n2+1
c2 must be of
capacity one. If hn2+1c2 = h
0
c1 then I contains precisely two couples. Otherwise
hn2+1c2 is a new hospital of capacity one and prefers r
1
c3 to r
n2
s2 .
Since hn2+1c2 has r
1
c3 in first place on its preference list, it must be the case
that r1c3 expresses a joint preference as part of the couple (r
1
c3 , r
2
c3) for a hospital
pair involving hn2+1c2 ; let this pair be (h
n2+1
c2 , h
1
c3).
Since h1c3 has r
2
c3 in first place on its preference list, h
2
c3 must be of capacity
one and prefer some other resident to r2c3 ; let this resident be rz.
Case (ii): ry is a member of a couple and thus n2 = 0. Let ry = r
1
c2 . Then
h1c2 prefers r
1
c3 to r
2
c2 . Assume that r
1
c3 is part of a couple (r
1
c3 , r
2
c3) and further
assume that (r1c3 , r
2
c3) finds (h
1
c2 , h
1
c3) acceptable. If h
1
c3 = h
0
c1 then I contains
three couples and is of the form shown in Figure 8 with N = 3 and n3 = 0. (In
this case h0c1 prefers r
1
c1 to r
2
c3 .) Otherwise, h
1
c3 is a new hospital which must be
of capacity one (or else (r1c3 , r
2
c3) represents a fixed assignment with (h
1
c2 , h
1
c3)
and must prefer some resident to r2c3 ; let this resident be rz.
Now, in both cases we have that if h1c3 6= h0c1 then h1c3 is of capacity one and
prefers some resident rz to r
2
c3 . As before, we may continue generating a sequence
of distinct residents, couples and hospitals in this fashion, but since the number
of residents and couples is finite, we must eventually reach some resident, either
single or a member of a couple who must be in second place in h0c1 ’s preference
list and a complete instance of (2, 1, 2)-hrc is formed. Thus, the instance I must
be of the form shown in Figure 8. uunionsq
Lemma 13 An instance I of (2, 1, 2)-hrc of the form shown in Figure 8 admits
a stable matching if and only if the number of couples involved in I is even.
Proof. Let M be a stable matching in I. It is either the case that (r1c1 , r
2
c1) is
assigned in M or (r1c1 , r
2
c1) is unassigned in M . We now consider each of these
cases and show that in either case if I contains an odd number of couples then
I cannot admit a stable matching.
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Case (i): Assume (r1c1 , r
2
c1) is assigned in M and therefore (r
1
c1 , h
0
c1) ∈M . Clearly
either n1 = 0 or n1 > 0. We now show that whether n1 = 0 or n1 > 0, if (r
1
c1 , r
2
c1)
is assigned in M then (r1c2 , r
2
c2) is unassigned in M .
If n1 = 0 and the instance contains exactly one couple, then (r
1
c1 , r
2
c1) repre-
sents a fixed assignment with (h0c1 , h
1
c1), a contradiction. Thus, I contains more
than one couple. Let the second couple in I be (r1c2 , r
2
c2) such that h
1
c1 has r
1
c2 in
first place on its preference list. We now have that (r1c2 , r
2
c2) expresses a prefer-
ence for (h1c1 , h
1
c2) and since (r
2
c1 , h
1
c1) ∈M , clearly (r1c2 , r2c2) cannot be assigned
in M .
If n1 > 0 then h
1
c1 has r
1
s1 in first place on its preference list. Now, if r
1
s1
is unassigned in M then (r1s1 , h
1
c1) blocks M . Hence r
1
s1 must be assigned in M
and moreover (r1s1 , h
2
c1) ∈ M . In similar fashion we may confirm that each ras1
(1 ≤ a < n1) is assigned to the hospital ha+1c1 in first place on its preference list.
Now consider, rn1s1 . Again r
n1
s1 must be assigned to the hospital in first place in
its preference list. If I contains exactly one couple then this hospital must be h0c1
by Lemma 12. However, by assumption (r1c1 , h
0
c1) ∈ M , a contradiction. Thus
I must contain more than one couple. Now, let hn1+1c1 be the hospital in first
place on rn1s1 ’s preference list. Since (r
n1
s1 , h
n1+1
c1 ) ∈ M , clearly (r1c2 , r2c2) cannot
be assigned in M as the only pair they find acceptable is (hn1+1c1 , h
1
c2). Thus, we
have that whether n1 = 0 or n1 > 0, if (r
1
c1 , r
2
c1) is assigned in M then (r
1
c2 , r
2
c2)
is not assigned in M .
Now, either n2 = 0 or n2 > 0. We now show that whether n2 = 0 or n2 > 0, if
(r1c2 , r
2
c2) is unassigned in M then (r
1
c3 , r
2
c3) must be assigned in M . If n2 = 0 and
the instance contains exactly two couples then (r1c2 , r
2
c2) expresses a preference
for either (h1c1 , h
0
c1) if n1 = 0 (or (h
n1+1
c1 , h
0
c1) if n1 > 0) and h
0
c1 has r
2
c2 in second
place on its preference list. In this case, the instance admits exactly two stable
matchings of equal cardinality. If n2 = 0 and the instance contains more than
two couples then (r1c3 , r
2
c3) expresses a preference for (h
1
c2 , h
1
c3). Now assume,
h1c2 is unassigned in M . Then (r
1
c2 , r
2
c2) blocks M with (h
1
c1 , h
0
c1) if n1 = 0 (or
(hn1+1c1 , h
0
c1) if n1 > 0), a contradiction. Thus we have that if (r
1
c2 , r
2
c2) is not
assigned in M then (r1c3 , r
2
c3) must be assigned to (h
1
c2 , h
1
c3) in M .
If n2 > 0 then h
1
c2 has r
1
s2 in first place on its preference list. Now, if r
1
s2 is
not assigned in M then (r1s2 , h
1
c2) blocks M , a contradiction. Hence r
1
s2 must be
assigned in M and moreover (r1s2 , h
2
c2) ∈ M . In similar fashion we may confirm
that each ras2 (1 ≤ a ≤ n2) must be assigned in M to the hospital ha+1s2 in first
place in its preference list.
Now consider, rn2s2 . If the instance contains exactly two couples then the
hospital in first place in the preference list of rn2s2 must be h
0
c1 and the result
follows. However, if the instance contains more than two couples then the hospital
in first place in the preference list of rn2s2 must be a new hospital h
n2+1
c2 . Now
let the next couple be (r1c3 , r
2
c3). Assume (r
1
c3 , r
2
c3) is unassigned in M . Then
(rn2s2 , h
n2+1
c2 ) must block M , so (r
1
c3 , r
2
c3) must be assigned to (h
n2+1
c2 , h
1
c3) in M .
Thus, whether n2 = 0 or n2 > 0, if (r
1
c2 , r
2
c2) is unassigned in M then (r
1
c3 , r
2
c3)
must be assigned in M .
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In similar fashion either n3 = 0 or n3 > 0. Again, we show that whether
n3 = 0 or n3 > 0, if (r
1
c3 , r
2
c3) is assigned in M then (r
1
c4 , r
2
c4) is not assigned
in M . If n3 = 0 and the instance contains exactly three couples then (r
1
c3 , r
2
c3)
is assigned to (h1c2 , h
0
c1) if n2 = 0 (or (h
n2+1
c1 , h
0
c1 if n2 > 0) and h
0
c1 has r
2
c3 in
second place on its preference list. However, by assumption (r2c1 , h
0
c1) ∈ M , a
contradiction. Thus, I contains more than three couples and (r1c4 , r
2
c4) expresses
a preference for (h1c3 , h
1
c4) and since (r
1
c3 , h
1
c3) ∈M , (r1c4 , r2c4) cannot be assigned
in M .
If n3 > 0 then h
1
c3 has r
1
s3 in first place on its preference list. Now, if r
1
s3 is
not assigned in M then (r1s3 , h
1
c3) blocks M , a contradiction. Hence r
1
s3 must be
assigned in M and moreover (r1s3 , h
2
c3) ∈ M . In similar fashion we may confirm
that each ras3 (1 ≤ a < n3) is assigned to the hospital ha+1c3 in first place on its
preference list.
Now consider rn3s3 . If the instance contains exactly three couples then the
hospital in first place in the preference list of rn3s3 must be h
0
c1 . However, by
construction, (r2c1 , h
0
c1) ∈ M , a contradiction. Hence, the instance must have
more than three couples and the hospital in first place in the preference list of
rn3s3 must be a new hospital h
n3+1
c3 . Now let the next couple be (r
1
c4 , r
2
c4). Since
(rn3s3 , h
n3+1
c3 ) ∈ M , (r1c4 , r2c4) cannot be assigned in M . Thus, whether n3 = 0 or
n3 > 0, if (r
1
c3 , r
2
c3) is assigned in M then (r
1
c4 , r
2
c4) is not assigned in M .
Finally we consider whether n4 = 0 or n4 > 0. If n4 = 0 and the instance
contains exactly four couples then (r1c4 , r
2
c4) expresses a preference for the hospital
pair (h1c4 , h
0
c1) and h
0
c1 has r
2
c4 in second place on its preference list and the result
follows. Otherwise the instance contains more than four couples and (r1c5 , r
2
c5)
expresses a preference for (h1c4 , h
1
c5). Now assume, h
1
c4 is unassigned in M . Then
(r1c4 , r
2
c4) blocks M with (h
n4+1
c4 , h
1
c4), a contradiction. Thus (r
1
c5 , r
2
c5) must be
assigned to (h1c4 , h
1
c5) in M .
If n4 > 0 then h
1
c4 has r
1
s4 in first place on its preference list. If r
1
s4 is not
assigned in M then (r1s4 , h
1
c4) blocks M , a contradiction. Hence r
1
s4 must be
assigned in M and moreover (r1s4 , h
2
c4) ∈ M . In similar fashion we may confirm
that each ras4 (1 ≤ a ≤ n4) must be assigned in M to the hospital ha+1s4 in first
place in its preference list. Now consider, rn4s4 . If the instance contains exactly
four couples then the hospital in first place in the preference list of rn4s4 must be
h0c1 and the result follows.
At this point we observe that argument is similar for the case that the number
of couples is larger than four. As the preceding argument shows, if the number
of couples is odd, then no stable matching exists, a contradiction.
Case (ii): Now suppose that (r1c1 , r
2
c1) is unassigned in M . Then essentially
(r1c1 , r
2
c1) plays the role of (r
1
c2 , r
2
c2) in the proof above and we may continue
to generate a sequence of couples, every second of which is unassigned in M .
Again, the same proof above can be used to infer that if the number of couples
is odd, then no stable matching can exist.
Conversely, we show that if the number of couples in I is even then I admits
a stable matching. For ease of exposition we use the description of the instance
I shown in Figure 9 for this part of the proof. For clarity, this instance is exactly
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equivalent to the instance shown in Figure 8. Let M be the following matching
in I where hnN+1cN = h
0
c1 if nN > 0 and h
1
cN = h
0
c1 if nN = 0:
M = {(r1c1 , h0c1), (r2c1 , h1c1)}⋃ {(r1ck , hnk−1+1ck−1 ), (r2ck , h1ck) : 2 ≤ k ≤ N , nk−1 > 0, k mod 2 6= 0}⋃ {(r1ck , h2ck−1), (r2ck , h1ck) : 2 ≤ k ≤ N , nk−1 = 0, k mod 2 6= 0}⋃ {(rask , ha+1ck ) : 1 ≤ k ≤ N, 1 ≤ a ≤ nk, nk > 0}
Assume M is unstable. Then there must exist a blocking pair of M in I.
Clearly no single resident rask (1 ≤ k ≤ N, 1 ≤ a ≤ nk, nk > 0) can form
part of a blocking pair for M in I as he is assigned in M to his first preference.
Further, no couple (r1ck , r
2
ck
) (2 ≤ k ≤ N, k mod 2 6= 0} can form part of a
blocking pair for M in I as they are assigned to the hospital pair in first place
on their joint preference list, (h
nk−1+1
ck−1 , h
1
ck
) if nk > 0 or (h
2
ck−1 , h
1
ck
) if nk = 0.
Now, assume that (r1ck , r
2
ck
) (2 ≤ k ≤ N, k mod 2 = 1) blocks M . If nk−1 > 0
then (r1ck , r
2
ck
) blocks with (h
nk−1+1
ck−1 , h
1
ck
). However, h1ck is assigned in M to its
first preference r1sk and so cannot form part of a blocking pair, a contradiction.
If nk = 0 then (r
1
ck
, r2ck) blocks M with (h
2
ck−1 , h
1
ck
). However, h1ck is assigned in
M to its first preference (either r1sk if nk > 0, or r
1
ck+1
if nk = 0) and so cannot
form part of a blocking pair, a contradiction. Since no other possible blocking
pairs exist for M in I it must be the case that M is a stable matching in I and
the result is proven. uunionsq
Lemmas 12 and 13 lead to the following conclusion.
Theorem 14 (2, 1, 2)-min bp hrc is solvable in polynomial time.
Proof. Let I be an instance of (2, 1, 2)-hrc, and assume that M0 is a matching
in I in which all fixed assignments have been iteratively satisfied, and assume
that the corresponding deletions have been made from the preference lists in
I, yielding instance I ′. Lemma 12 shows that I ′ is a union of sub-instances
I1, I2, . . . , It, where each Ij is of the form shown in Figure 8 (1 ≤ j ≤ t).
For each j (1 ≤ j ≤ t), we show how to construct a matching Mj in sub-
instance Ij such that |bp(Mj)| ≤ 1. Let N be the number of couples in Ij .
Suppose firstly that N is even. The proof of Lemma 13 shows how to construct
a matching Mj that is stable in Ij .
Now suppose that N is odd. Then N ≥ 3, since all fixed assignments in I have
been iteratively satisfied. By Lemma 13, Ij does not admit a stable matching;
we will construct a matching Mj in I such that |bp(Mj)| = 1. Let k (1 ≤ k ≤ N)
be given.
Firstly assume that k is odd and k 6= N . Match (r1ck , r2ck) to the hospital pair
on their list. If nk > 0, match r
i
sk
to his first-choice hospital hi+1ck (1 ≤ i ≤ nk).
Now assume that k is even. Leave (r1ck , r
2
ck
) unassigned. If nk > 0, match r
i
sk
to his second-choice hospital hick (1 ≤ i ≤ nk). Finally assume that k = N . If
nN = 0, leave couple (r
1
cN , r
2
cN ) unassigned. Otherwise match (r
1
cN , r
2
cN ) to the
hospital pair on their list. Also for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ nN − 1), match risN to his
first-choice hospital hi+1cN , and leave r
nN
sN unassigned.
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It is straightforward to verify that if nN > 0 then bp(Mj) = {(rnNsN , hnNcN )}
in Ij . Otherwise if nN = 0 and nN−1 = 0, the only blocking pair of Mj in Ij
involves the couple (r1cN−1 , r
2
cN−1) and the hospital pair (h
1
cN−2 , h
1
cN−1). Finally
if nN = 0 and nN−1 > 0, bp(Mj) = {(rnN−1sN−1 , hnN−1+1cN−1 )} in Ij .
Clearly M = ∪tj=0Mj is then a most-stable matching in I. uunionsq
D An Integer Programming formulation for min bp hrc
D.1 Introduction
The IP model for min bp hrc is based on modelling the various types of blocking
pairs that might arise according to Definition 1, and allowing them to be counted
by imposing a series of linear inequalities. The variables are defined for each
resident, whether single or a member of a couple, and for each element on his
preference list (with the possibility of being unassigned). A further consistency
constraint ensures that each member of a couple obtains hospitals from the
same pair in their list, if assigned. A suitable objective function then enables the
number of blocking pairs to be minimised. Subject to this, we may also maximise
the size of the constructed matching.
A crucial component of the IP model is a mapping between the joint pref-
erence list of a couple (ri, rj) and individual preference lists for ri and rj ;
we call these individual lists the projected preference lists for ri and rj . Let
I be an instance of hrc with residents R = {r1, r2, . . . , rn1} and hospitals
H = {h1, h2, . . . , hn2}. Without loss of generality, suppose residents r1, r2 . . . r2c
are in couples. Again, without loss of generality, suppose that the couples are
(r2i−1, r2i) (1 ≤ i ≤ c). Suppose that the joint preference list of a couple
Ci = (r2i−1, r2i) is:
Ci : (hα1 , hβ1), (hα2 , hβ2) . . . (hαl , hβl)
From this list we create the following projected preference list for resident r2i−1:
r2i−1 : hα1 , hα2 . . . hαl
and the following projected preference list for resident r2i:
r2i : hβ1 , hβ2 . . . hβl
Let l(Ci) denote the length of the preference list of Ci and let l(r2i−1) and l(r2i)
denote the lengths of the projected preference lists of r2i−1 and r2i respectively.
Clearly we have that l(r2i−1) = l(r2i) = l(Ci). A given hospital hj may appear
more than once in the projected preference list of a resident belonging to a couple
Ci = (r2i−1, r2i).
The single residents are r2c+1, r2c+2 . . . rn1 , where each such resident ri, has
a preference list of length l(ri) consisting of individual hospitals hj ∈ H. Each
hospital hj ∈ H has a preference list of individual residents ri ∈ R of length
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l(hj). Further, each hospital hj ∈ H has capacity cj ≥ 1, the maximum number
of residents to which it may be assigned.
We describe the variables, constraints and objective function in the IP model
J for the min bp hrc instance I in Sections D.2, D.3 and D.4 respectively. The
text in bold before the definition of a constraint shows the blocking pair type
from Definition 1 to which the constraint corresponds. Finally in Section D.5 we
present a proof of correctness for the IP model for min bp hrc.
D.2 Variables in the IP model
In J , for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n1) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(ri)), define a variable xi,p such
that
xi,p =
{
1 if ri is assigned to his p
th choice hospital
0 otherwise.
For p = l(ri)+1 define a variable xi,p whose intuitive meaning is that resident
ri is unassigned. Thus we also have that
xi,l(ri)+1 =
{
1 if ri is unassigned
0 otherwise.
Let X = {xi,p : 1 ≤ i ≤ n1, 1 ≤ p ≤ l(ri) + 1}. For ease of exposition we
define some additional notation. For given i (1 ≤ i ≤ n1) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(ri),
let pref(ri, p) denote the hospital at position p of ri’s preference list (this is
the projected preference list of ri if 1 ≤ i ≤ 2c). For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ c) and p
(1 ≤ p ≤ l(r2i−1)), let pref((r2i−1, r2i), p) denote the hospital pair at position p
on the joint preference list of (r2i−1, r2i).
Also, for an acceptable resident-hospital pair (ri, hj), let rank(hj , ri) = q
denote the rank that hospital hj assigns resident ri, where 1 ≤ q ≤ l(hj).
Further, for each j (1 ≤ j ≤ n2) and q (1 ≤ q ≤ l(hj)) let the set R(hj , q)
contain the resident-position pairs (ri, p) such that ri is assigned a rank of q
(1 ≤ q ≤ l(hj)) by hj and hj is at position p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(ri)) in ri’s preference
list (or ri’s projected preference list if ri belongs to a couple). Hence:
R(hj , q) = {(ri, p) ∈ R×Z : rank(hj , ri) = q ∧ 1 ≤ p ≤ l(ri)∧ pref(ri, p) = hj}.
Now, for all j (1 ≤ j ≤ n2) and q (1 ≤ q ≤ l(hj)), define a new variable αj,q ∈
{0, 1}. The intuitive meaning of a variable αj,q is that if hj is fully subscribed
with assignees better than rank q then αj,q may take the value 0 or 1. However,
if hj is not full with assignees better than rank q then αj,q = 1. Constraints (2)
and 13 described in Section D.3 are applied to enforce this property.
Now, for all j (1 ≤ j ≤ n2) and q (1 ≤ q ≤ l(hj)), define a new variable
βj,q ∈ {0, 1}. The intuitive meaning of a variable βj,q is that if hj has cj − 1 or
more assignees better than rank q then βj,q may take a value of 0 or 1. However,
if hj has fewer than cj−1 assignees better than rank q then βj,q = 1. Constraints
(3) and 14 described in Section D.3 are applied to enforce this property.
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Finally, for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ n1) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(ri)), define a new variable
θi,p ∈ {0, 1}. The intuitive meaning of a variable θi,p is that θi,p = 1 if resident
ri is involved in a blocking pair with the hospital at position p on his preference
list, either as a single resident or as part of a couple, and θi,p = 0 otherwise.
D.3 Constraints in the IP model
The following constraint simply ensures that each variable xi,p must be binary
valued for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ n1) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(ri) + 1):
xi,p ∈ {0, 1} (1)
Similarly, the following constraint ensures that each variable αj,q must be binary
valued for all j (1 ≤ j ≤ n2) and q (1 ≤ q ≤ l(hj)):
αj,q ∈ {0, 1} (2)
Also, the following constraint ensures that each variable βj,q must be binary
valued for all j (1 ≤ j ≤ n2) and q (1 ≤ q ≤ l(hj)):
βj,q ∈ {0, 1} (3)
Similarly the following constraint ensures that each variable θi,p must be binary
valued for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ n1) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(ri) + 1):
θi,p ∈ {0, 1} (4)
As each resident ri ∈ R is assigned to exactly one hospital or is unassigned (but
not both), we introduce the following constraint for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ n1):
l(ri)+1∑
p=1
xi,p = 1 (5)
Since a hospital hj may be assigned at most cj residents, xi,p = 1 where
pref(ri, p) = hj for at most cj residents. We thus obtain the following constraint
for all j (1 ≤ j ≤ n2):
n1∑
i=1
l(ri)∑
p=1
{xi,p ∈ X : pref(ri, p) = hj} ≤ cj (6)
For each couple (r2i−1, r2i), r2i−1 is unassigned if and only if r2i is unassigned,
and r2i−1 is assigned to the hospital in position p in their individual list if and
only if r2i is assigned to the hospital in position p in their individual list. We thus
obtain the following constraint for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ c) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(r2i−1) + 1):
x2i−1,p = x2i,p (7)
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Type 1 blocking pairs. In matching M in I, if a single resident ri ∈ R is
unassigned or has a worse partner than some hospital hj ∈ H where pref(ri, p) =
hj and rank(hj , ri) = q then hj must be fully subscribed with better partners
than ri, for otherwise (ri, hj) blocks M . Hence if ri is unassigned or has worse
partner than hj , i.e.,
l(ri)+1∑
p′=p+1
xi,p′ = 1, and hj is not fully subscribed with better
partners than ri, i.e.,
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′ , p′′) ∈ R(hj , q′)} < cj , then we
require θi,p = 1 to count this blocking pair. Thus, for each i (2c + 1 ≤ i ≤ n1)
and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(ri)) we obtain the following constraint where pref(ri, p) = hj
and rank(hj , ri) = q:
cj
l(ri)+1∑
p′=p+1
xi,p′
− θi,p
 ≤ q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′ , p′′) ∈ R(hj , q′)} (8)
In this way, we can count the number of blocking pairs using the θi,p values.
A similar methodology is used in all replacement constraints for the remaining
stability criteria that follow. Ultimately, the number of blocking pairs is the sum
of the θi,p values, except that to avoid counting a blocking pair twice in the case
of a couple, the model will assume that θ2i,p = 0 for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ c) and for all
p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(r2i)).
Type 2a blocking pairs. In a matching M in I, if a couple Ci = (r2i−1, r2i)
jointly prefer hospital pair (hj1 , hj2), at position p1 in Ci’s joint preference list, to
(M(r2i−1),M(r2i)), at position p2, and hj1 is undersubscribed or prefers r2i−1
to one of its assignees in M , and hj2 = M(r2i), then (r2i−1, r2i) blocks M
with (hj1 , hj2). In the special case where pref(r2i−1, p1) = pref(r2i, p1) = hj1 , if
hj1 = hj2 = M(r2i), hj1 is undersubscribed or prefers r2i−1 to one of its assignees
in M other than r2i, then again (r2i−1, r2i) blocks M with (hj1 , hj2).
Thus, for the general case, we obtain the following constraint for all i (1 ≤
i ≤ c) and p1, p2 (1 ≤ p1 < p2 ≤ l(r2i−1)) such that pref(r2i, p1) = pref(r2i, p2)
and rank(hj1 , r2i−1) = q:
cj1(x2i−1,p2 − θ2i−1,p1) ≤
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′ , p′′) ∈ R(hj1 , q′)} (9)
For the special case in which pref(r2i−1, p1) = pref(r2i, p1) = hj1 we obtain the
following constraint for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ c) and p1, p2 where (1 ≤ p1 < p2 ≤ l(r2i−1))
such that pref(r2i, p1) = pref(r2i, p2) and rank(hj1 , r2i−1) = q:
(cj1 − 1)(x2i−1,p2 − θ2i−1,p1) ≤
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : q′ 6= rank(hj1 , r2i) ∧ (ri′ , p′′) ∈ R(hj1 , q′)} (10)
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Type 2b blocking pairs. A similar constraint is required for the case that
the odd-subscript member of a given couple stays assigned to the same hospital.
Thus, for the general case, we obtain the following constraint for all i (1 ≤
i ≤ c) and p1, p2 where (1 ≤ p1 < p2 ≤ l(r2i)) such that pref(r2i−1, p1) =
pref(r2i−1, p2) and rank(hj2 , r2i) = q:
cj2(x2i−1,p2 − θ2i−1,p1) ≤
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′ , p′′) ∈ R(hj2 , q′)} (11)
Again, for the special case in which pref(r2i−1, p1) = pref(r2i, p1) = hj2 we
obtain the following constraint for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ c) and p1, p2 where (1 ≤ p1 <
p2 ≤ l(r2i)) such that pref(r2i−1, p1) = pref(r2i−1, p2) and rank(hj2 , r2i) = q:
(cj1 − 1)(x2i−1,p2 − θ2i−1,p1) ≤
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : q′ 6= rank(hj2 , r2i−1) ∧ (ri′ , p′′) ∈ R(hj2 , q′)} (12)
Now, we define a variable αj,q such that if hj is full with assignees better than
rank q then αj,q may take the value of zero or one. Otherwise, hj is not full
with assignees better than rank q and αj,q = 1. Hence, we obtain the following
constraint for all j (1 ≤ j ≤ n2) and q (1 ≤ q ≤ l(hj)):
αj,q ≥ 1−
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi,p ∈ X : (ri, p) ∈ R(hj , q′)}
cj
(13)
Next we define a variable βj,q such that if hj has cj − 1 or more assignees better
than rank q then βj,q may take a value of zero or one. Otherwise, hj has fewer
than cj − 1 assignees better than rank q and βj,q = 1. Hence, we obtain the
following constraint all j (1 ≤ j ≤ n2) and q (1 ≤ q ≤ l(hj)):
βj,q ≥ 1−
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi,p ∈ X : (ri, p) ∈ R(hj , q′)}
(cj − 1) (14)
Type 3a blocking pairs. In a matching M in I, if a couple Ci = (r2i−1, r2i)
is unassigned or assigned to a worse hospital pair than (hj1 , hj2) (where hj1 6=
hj2), and for each t ∈ {1, 2}, hjt is undersubscribed and finds r2i−2+t accept-
able, or prefers r2i−2+t to its worst assignee, then (r2i−1, r2i) blocks M with
(hj1 , hj2). Thus we obtain the following constraint for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ c) and p
(1 ≤ p ≤ l(r2i−1)) where hj1 = pref(r2i−1, p), hj2 = pref(r2i, p), hj1 6= hj2 ,
rank(hj1 , r2i−1) = q1 and rank(hj2 , r2i) = q2:
l(r2i−1)+1∑
p′=p+1
x2i−1,p′ + αj1,q1 + αj2,q2 − θ2i−1,p ≤ 2 (15)
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Type 3b/c blocking pairs. In a matching M in I, if a couple Ci = (r2i−1, r2i)
is unassigned or assigned to a worse pair than (hj , hj) where M(r2i−1) 6= hj and
M(r2i) 6= hj , (r2i−1, r2i) finds (hj , hj) acceptable, and hj has two or more free
posts available, then (r2i−1, r2i) blocks M with (hj , hj) – this is a Type 3b
blocking pair. In a matching M in I, if a couple Ci = (r2i−1, r2i) is unassigned
or assigned to a worse pair than (hj , hj) where M(r2i−1) 6= hj and M(r2i) 6= hj ,
(r2i−1, r2i) finds (hj , hj) acceptable, and hj prefers at least one of r2i−1 or r2i
to some assignee of hj in M while simultaneously having a single free post, then
(r2i−1, r2i) blocks M with (hj , hj) – this is a Type 3c blocking pair.
These two blocking pair types may be modelled by a single constraint. For
each i (1 ≤ i ≤ c) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(r2i−1)) such that pref(r2i−1, p) = pref(r2i, p)
and hj = pref(r2i−1, p), where q = min{rank(hj , r2i), rank(hj , r2i−1)}, we en-
force the following:
cj
l(r2i−1)+1∑
p′=p+1
x2i−1,p′
− θ2i−1,p
−
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′ , p′′) ∈ R(hj , q′)}
(cj − 1)
≤
l(hj)∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′ , p′′) ∈ R(hj , q′)} (16)
Type 3d blocking pairs. In a matching M in I, if a couple Ci = (r2i−1, r2i) is
unassigned or jointly assigned to a worse pair than (hj , hj) where M(r2i−1) 6= hj
and M(r2i) 6= hj , and hj is full and also has two assignees rs and rt (where s 6= t)
such that hj prefers r2i−1 to rs and hj prefers r2i to rt, then (r2i−1, r2i) blocks
M with (hj , hj).
For each (hj , hj) acceptable to (r2i−1, r2i), let rmin be the better of r2i−1 and
r2i according to hospital hj with rank(hj , rmin) = qmin. Analogously, let rmax be
the worse of r2i and r2i−1 according to hospital hj with rank(hj , rmax) = qmax.
Then we obtain the following constraint for i (1 ≤ i ≤ c) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(r2i−1))
such that pref(r2i−1, p) = pref(r2i, p) = hj :
l(r2i−1)+1∑
p′=p+1
x2i−1,p′ + αj,qmax + βj,qmin − θ2i−1,p ≤ 2 (17)
D.4 Objective function in the IP model
A maximum cardinality most-stable matching M is a matching of maximum car-
dinality, taken over all most-stable matchings in I. To compute such a matching
in J , we apply two objective functions in sequence.
First we find an optimal solution in J that minimises the number of blocking
pairs. To this end, we apply the following objective function:
min
n1∑
i=1
l(ri)∑
p=1
θi,p (18)
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The matching M corresponding to an optimal solution in J will be a most-
stable matching in I. Let k = |bp(M)|. Now we week a maximum cardinality
matching in I with at most k blocking pairs. Thus we add the following constraint
to J , which ensures that, when maximising on cardinality, any solution also has
at most k blocking pairs:
n1∑
i=1
l(ri)∑
p=1
θi,p ≤ k (19)
The final step is to maximise the size of the matching, subject to the matching
being most-stable. This involves optimising for a second time, this time using
the following objective function:
max
n1∑
i=1
l(ri)∑
p=1
xi,p. (20)
D.5 Proof of correctness for the IP model
We now establish the correctness of the IP model for min bp hrc presented in
Sections D.2, D.3 and D.4.
Theorem 15 Given an instance I of min bp hrc, let J be the corresponding
IP model as defined in Sections D.2, D.3 and D.4 (omitting Constraint (19) and
objective function (20)). A most-stable matching in I is exactly equivalent to an
optimal solution to J with respect to objective function (18).
Proof. Let M be a most-stable matching in I. Let 〈x,α,β〉 be the corresponding
assignment of boolean values to the variables in J as constructed in the proof of
Theorem 12 in [7]. Initially let θi,p = 0 for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ n1) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(ri)).
Assume that (ri, hj) blocks M where ri is a single resident and pref(ri, p) =
hj . Then Constraint (8) will be violated if θi,p = 0. Set θi,p = 1. Then the LHS
of Constraint (8) becomes 0 and the constraint is satisfied.
Now, assume that (ri, rj) blocks M with (hk, hl) for some couple (ri, rj),
where pref((ri, rj), p) = (hk, hl). Then depending on which part of Definition
1 is violated, one of the constraints in the range (9)-(12) and (15)-(17) will be
violated if θi,p = 0. By setting θi,p = 1, the constraint concerned will be satisfied.
It follows that 〈x,α,β,θ〉 is a feasible solution to J . Moreover the objective
value of this solution is equal to |bp(M)|.
Conversely, let 〈x,α,β,θ〉 be an optimal solution to J and let M be the
corresponding matching in I as constructed in the proof of Theorem 12 in [7].
Now assume that θi,p = 1 for some i (1 ≤ i ≤ n1) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(ri)). If
ri is not involved in a blocking pair with hj where pref(ri, p) = hj (either as
a single resident or part of a couple), then by Theorem 12 in [7], Constraints
(8) to (12) and (15)-(17) are satisfied with θi,p = 0, in contradiction to the fact
that 〈x,α,β,θ〉 is optimal according to objective function (18). Thus if θi,p = 1
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for some i (1 ≤ i ≤ n1) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(rn1)) then ri must be involved in a
blocking pair with the hospital in position p on his preference list.
On the other hand, by the first direction, if there is a blocking pair of M , there
must be a unique corresponding θi,p that has value 1. It follows that |bp(M)| is
equal to the objective value of 〈x,α,β,θ〉 in J . uunionsq
By enforcing Constraint (19) and imposing objective function (20), we obtain
the following corollary.
Corollary 16 Given an instance I of min bp hrc let J be the corresponding
IP model as defined in Sections D.2, D.3 and D.4 (omitting objective function
(18)). A maximum cardinality most-stable matching in I is exactly equivalent to
an optimal solution to J with respect to objective function (20).
